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TEXTUALISM IN GATT/WTO JURISPRUDENCE:
LESSONS FOR THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION
DEBATE
Dongsheng Zang*
The pleasures of interpretation are... linked to loss and
disappointment, so that most of us will find the task too hard, or simply
repugnant, and then, abandoning meaning, we slip back into the old
comfortablefictions of transparency,the single sense, the truth.
-Frank Kermode (1979)1
A word is not a crystal, transparentand unchanged,it is the skin of
a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to
the circumstances and the time in which it is used.
-Justice Holmes (1918)2
INTRODUCTION

Today, the World Trade Organization (WTO) 3 jurisprudence is
subject to tremendous controversy, the WTO panels' or Appellate
Body's interpretation of a WTO text is often heatedly debated; and yet,
there seems not much attention paid to the general methodology of
interpretation in the practice of the General Agreement on Tariff and
Trade (GATT) and WTO jurisprudence, even in a recent debate over

* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law, Seattle,
WA. Research Fellow, Harvard Law School, 2004-2005. S.J.D. 2004, LL.M. 1996, Harvard
Law School. I wish to thank Professors William P. Alford and Duncan Kennedy who have
read the whole or parts of the manuscript. I also wish to thank Alejandro L. Escorihuela for
his inspiration and help from many of our conversations. I am also indebted to Hani Sayed,
Joel Ngugi, John Ohnesorge, Sylvia Wairimu Kang'ara, Alvaro Santos, Hengameh Saberi,
Sungjoon Cho, Kala Mulqueeny and Zhen Han, for their willingness to share their insights
and to lend their support in the long process of working on this article. My colleagues
Veronica Taylor and Louis E. Wolcher have been extremely supportive and encouraging.
Last, but not the least, I am grateful to the assistance from Claire O'Brien and Cynthia
Fester. All errors are mine.
1. FRANK KERMODE, THE GENESIS OF SECRECY: ON THE INTERPRETATION OF NARRATIVE

123 (1979).
2. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (Holmes, J. on behalf of the Court).
3. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter the
WTO Agreement], Annex IA, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
(1994)

[hereinafter

RESULTS

OF

THE

URUGUAY

http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/legal-e.htm.

ROUND],

available

at
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constitutionalization between Petersmann and his critics.4 In rejecting
his human rights approach to constitutionalization, Petersmann's critics,
rightfully, warn him that he has failed to appreciate the complex
relations between human rights and free trade in the history of European
integration and WTO. But they seem reluctant to go further and
challenge the foundation of his constitutionalization arguments, i.e., his
theory of adjudication. Thus, in spite of its central role in the
GATT/WTO jurisprudence, the mythology about textualism remains
only half challenged-that the textual approach equals "strict
interpretation," and "following the letters" of the WTO agreements is a
judicial virtue. What I wish to accomplish in this article is to push the
critique one step further by looking into the interpretive methodologies
of the GATT/WTO jurisprudence. 5
Textualism is a way of reading and interpreting legal instruments,
the core of which is that privilege is given to the text, based upon a
perception that the textual approach provides adequate legitimacy for
adjudication.6 In the jurisprudence of the WTO, one of the most
frequently invoked doctrines in interpretation is "ordinary meaning";
very often, "ordinary meaning" is discovered by looking a word up in a
dictionary. Use of a dictionary, strongly condemned by Jeremy
Bentham at the end of eighteenth-century, 7 is welcomed and embraced

4. See Infra text accompanying notes 238-48.
5. This article does not address the complexities caused by different languages as is
common in multilateral international treaties. Recently, the AB relied upon the French and
Spanish versions in its interpretation of paragraph 2(a) of the Enabling Clause, WTO AB
Report, European Communities-Conditionsfor the Granting of Tariff Preferences to
Developing Countries (AB-2004-1), WT/DS246/AB/R, circulated to members on April 7,
2004, adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) at its meeting on April 20, 2004
[hereinafter EC-Tariff Preferences], para. 147. See Dinah Shelton, Reconcilable
Differences? The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.

REV. 611 (1997) (discussing the increasing difficulty in multilateral treaties in the
multilingual context); Peter Germer, Interpretation of Plurilingual Treaties: A Study of
Article 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 11 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 400
(1970).
6. The term textualism comes from study of constitutional interpretation in the United
States. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994);

William N. Eskridge, Jr., All about Words: Early Understandingsof the 'JudicialPower' in
Statutory Interpretation,1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990 (2001); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990).
7. Bentham regarded using the dictionary to determine the meaning of a text in the law
as a usurpation of the authority of the legislator: that would make the common dictionary a
book of law; even more than that, that would be tantamount to "recognizing the author of
the dictionary as being pro tanto the superior legislator." JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN
GENERAL 159, §4 (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1970) (1791). Bentham's critique of the dictionary
school is not accidental. In a sense, as H.L.A. Hart has noticed, Bentham anticipated what
later language philosophy identified as "emotive meaning." H.L.A. HART, Bentham and the
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by the GATT/WTO jurisprudence. It is even hailed by Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, who served as the first Legal Adviser in GATT from 1981
to 1995, and in WTO from 1995 to 2000, and one of the major
architects of the GATT/WTO system along with John H. Jackson and
Jan Tumlir. As he puts it clearly: "[t]hanks to the wisdom of the
Appellate Body of the [WTO], the Oxford English Dictionary has been
cited in almost every appellate report since 1995 and is emerging as one
of the leading sources for the interpretation of WTO law." 8 This
textualist approach is often characteristically justified as a mandate
required by the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties. 9 Michael
Lennard's recent survey of treaty interpretation in the WTO
jurisprudence is probably the best account of textualism and its relations
with the Vienna Convention. 10 He enthusiastically compares the
Appellate Body (AB)'s task of treaty interpretation to that of the early
navigators scanning the stars to guide their uncertain journeys, and he
concludes, "[o]n this analogy, in drawing up a map to guide itself, and
particularly the Panels, the Appellate Body has taken its basic bearings
from the essentially text-based approach of the Vienna Convention, and
has generally avoided other distracting points of light."' "I
This article is a study of an approach in treaty interpretation in the
jurisprudence of WTO and its predecessor, the GATT.12 The above
statement of Petersmann represents the more recent approach at the
WTO, i.e., the semantic textualism that will be elaborated in Part III of
this article. Part II, will show an earlier version of textualism in the
GATT period, the exclusionary textualism, which is of a different type
but shares the same philosophy. Compared with other international or

Demystification of the Law (1973), reprinted in ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN
JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 27 (1982).
8. Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, Tribute: On the Constitution of John Jackson, 20 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 149 (1999).
9. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done at Vienna, May 23, 1969, came
into force on Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter the Vienna
Convention]. For commentaries of the Vienna Convention, see SIR IAN SINCLAIR, THE
VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 114-58 (2d ed., 1984); Richard D. Kearney
& Robert E. Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 495 (1970); Ian Johnstone,
Treaty Interpretation:The Authority of Interpretive Communities, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 371
(1991).
10. Michael Lennard, Navigating by the Stars: Interpretingthe WTO Agreements, 5 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 17 (2002) (discussing the application of the Vienna Convention by the WTO
panels and the Appellate Body in cases and jurisprudence).
11. Id. at 85-86.
12. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A- 11, 55 U.N.T.S.
194. This Agreement, which is often referred to as "GATT 1947," has been incorporated
into the WTO agreements, and has become "GATT 1994" under the WTO framework. Id.

396
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super-national judicial bodies such as the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) or the European Court of Justice (ECJ), textualism in the
GATT/WTO jurisprudence is unique. Thus it has to be understood in
the background of its own history, namely, a movement characterized
by a slogan called the "rule-based" international economic order (IEO),
a popular term in today's lexicon that had become widely accepted in
the circle in the 1980s. The "rule-based" IEO was posed as the
antithetical alternative to the "power-based." At the center of this "rulebased" IEO lies the emphasis on adjudication, as the alternative to
diplomacy, often characterized as mere power bargaining between
nations; and again, in the adjudicative process, textualism is regarded as
the core of its jurisprudence.
The claim of this article, as a critique, is that textualism does not
function in the way conventional wisdom assumes; rather, it tends to
hide substantive or strategic policy issues in reading into or out of the
text, without acknowledging that a position in those issues may have
predetermined the way the text is read and interpreted. Thus, the textual
analysis only shows the surface, the phenomenon, and consequently, the
results, not the beginning, of legal reasoning. The claim, however, is not
made as a general critique of language philosophy; rather, what I try to
do in this article is to show how the doctrines of textualism are unfolded
in specific cases and disputes in the GATT/WTO dispute settlement
process. The first and foremost challenge to textualism is nothing else
but its own practice and history.
I.

THE "RULE-BASED" INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER

From the end of 1970s, the public-choice economics and an earlier
German school of thought, the ordo-liberal school, had become a widely
shared view among scholars and practitioners in the framework of
GATT, as can be seen in the work of Jan Tumlir, John Jackson and
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann.' 3 Public-choice theory claims that because of
free-rider problems and information costs, it is more difficult for the
general public to organize themselves and compete with special
interests in the legislative or policy-making process. When applied to
international trade, it is natural to conclude that as trade policy in a
democracy is heavily influenced by special interests of domestic
industry, that trade policy has a natural tendency towards protectionism.

13. This issue deserves a separate and in-depth treatment, especially considering that
international trade lawyers today do not pay much attention to the history of ideas in the
framework of GATT. Dongsheng Zang, When Did Conservative Economics 'Capture'
GA TT? (working paper, on file with author).
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Therefore, the role of international institutions such as GATT
discipline the decision-making process on member-state level,
that sense, the GATTAVTO represents the "public interest"
consumers in the battle to counterbalance the advantages
of the
14
interests groups embodied in the protectionist states.

was to
and in
of the
special

In line with this perspective, the problems in international
economic order are increasingly perceived as failure in compliance,
rather than in policy coordination; attention is focused on legaldispute settlement, enforcement-rather than political or policy issues.
In the last two or three decades efforts have been made on strengthening
the legal apparatus-stricter procedures and more professionalized
panels, as many people have urged. Essentially, "public institutions"
such as GATT/WTO are regarded as legal instruments to
counterbalance the alleged protectionist attempts that often prevail in
the domestic politics of member-states. In this aspect, its slogans, "rulebased" or "rule-oriented" system, widely used in the past two decades,
were posed as a contrast with the so-called "GATT-pragmatism" which
was said to prevail in the first couple of decades after GATT was
established.' 5 The rule-based IEO under the framework GATT/WTO
has three fundamental characteristics that would be vital for the critique
developed in this article: the conceptual dichotomy of rule-based and
the power-based IEO; the mystified connection between ruleapplication and adjudication; and finally, textualism in reading
international agreements.
A.

The ConceptualDichotomy of the Rule-oriented and PowerorientedlEO

The rule-based IEO is founded on a series of conceptual
dichotomies such as rule versus power, the "rule-based" or "ruleoriented" versus the "power-based," law versus politics, the judicial
versus the political, etc., and it is always stressed that the former is more
14. E.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, GATT as a Public Institution: The Uruguay Round and
Beyond, 18 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 31 (1992); J. Michael Finger, The GATT as an
International Discipline over Trade Restrictions: A Public Choice Perspective, in THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 125 (Roland Vaubel & Thomas D.
Willett eds., 1991); Judith Goldstein, International Institutions and Domestic Politics:
GATT, WTO and the Liberalization of International Trade, in THE WTO AS AN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 133 (Anne 0. Krueger ed., 1998).
15. This was elaborated by Oliver Long, former Director-General of GATT, 1968-80,
in as late as 1985, see OLIVER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT
MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM (1985). See also Joln G. Ruggie, International Regimes,

Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Post-warEconomic Order, 36 INT'L
ORG. 379 (1982).

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 33:393

desirable than the latter. The view is that politics, diplomacy and
populism tend to "distort" the market and therefore increase the "cost,"
and it becomes scandalous when it is "revealed" that they are behind the
scene. 16 In John H. Jackson's early works, emphasis was put on this
difference between the legal and the political. Jackson's masterpiece
treatise, World Trade and the Law of GATT (1969), as Robert E. Hudec
recalled, was written at a "high point of what became known as the
'anti-legalist' movement in GATT."' 7 Jackson distinguished himself
from the GATT-pragmatists in asserting that, "[o]ne of the reasons that
makes GATT an interesting object of scrutiny... is that it was intended
to contain precisely formulated legal rules, sometimes termed
'contractual,' which were to be directly applied without further
elaboration."' 8 In 1978, while the world was plunged into trade wars
before the conclusion of the Tokyo Round negotiations, Jackson warned
that the crises lay in the fact that law was "missing" in the GATT:
Agreed rules have great importance as a tool of modem diplomacy,
particularly in international economic matters .... But these rules are

incapable of playing their important role unless they are set in a
framework of an effective "legal system"; a system that provides for
application of the rules to particular facts, objective methods of
determining those facts, trusted interpretations of the rules, and
methods by which these actions are kept consistent and reasonably
predictable. In the GATT (and in world economic relations generally)
this well-constructed system is missing. 19
Here in highlighting the legal aspect of GATT, Jackson clearly had a
public-choice view in mind, and he saw the "domestic political
pressures" as something complicating the operation of the world trading

16. E.g., STEPHEN C. NEFF, FRIENDS BUT No ALLIES: ECONOMIC LIBERALISM AND THE
LAW OF NATIONS (1990) (where Neff contrasts the "economic world order" with the
"political" world order).
17. Robert E. Hudec, Tribute: The Expedition to Darkest Geneva, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L.
121, 124 (1998-1999). Hudec noted that, "This was a period from the early 1960s to about
1970 when the leading GATT governments-chiefly the United States, the European
Community and the United Kingdom-became attached to the view that legal claims were
not the way to solve trade conflicts, and that only diplomatic negotiation could reconcile the
underlying social and economic interests that gave rise to such conflicts." Id. at 124.
18. JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF

THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 12 (1969) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT].

19. John H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of International Trade: The DISC Case in
GATT, 72 AM. J. INT'L. L. 747, 749 (1978) (parenthesis in original).
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system. In another article published in the same year, 20 he formally
established the conceptual dichotomy of "power-oriented" and "ruleoriented" diplomacy. 2' For Jackson, "power oriented" diplomacy is "a
diplomat asserting, subtly or otherwise, the power of the nation he
represents., 22 In contrast, "[a] rule-oriented approach ... would suggest
that a rule be formulated which makes broad policy sense for the benefit
of the world and the parties concerned, and then there should be an
attempt to develop institutions to insure the highest possible degree of
adherence to that rule. 23 Thus, the conceptual dichotomy between
power-oriented and rule-oriented is illustrated by a series of contrasts:
the political versus the legal, the "muscles" versus fairness, 24 secrecy
versus publicity,25 the short-range versus the long-range,26 etc. In
addition, Jackson explicitly envisioned that there would be an evolution
from the power-oriented to the rule-oriented.27 Jackson concluded that,
Consequently, the only appropriate way to turn seems to be toward a
rule oriented system, whereby the various layers of citizens,
parliaments, executives and international organizations will all have
their inputs, arriving tortuously to a rule, which however, when
established will enable business and other decentralized decisions
makers to rely upon the stability and predictability of governmental

20. John H. Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System, 12 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 93 (1978) [hereinafter The Crumbling Institutions].
21. Id. at 98-101.
22. Id. at 98.
23. Id. at 99.
24. The rule-oriented approach means "less reliance on raw power and the temptation
to exercise it or flex one's muscles which can get out of hand... " Id. at 100.
25. Jackson noted that the "power oriented" negotiating process often required secrecy
and executive discretion so as to be able to formulate and implement the necessary
compromises. The CrumblingInstitutions,supra note 20, at 100-01.
26. Id. at 103
[T]he institutional and bureaucratic problems of trying to advocate longer range
solutions in the face of the daily grind, as well as the lack of legal training and
sophistication of many of the participants in the negotiation, also play a role. I have
been surprised for instance, about the misconceptions as to how a legal system or
rule oriented process operates. There seems to be a feeling that it is 'all or nothing,'
that a rule system will always completely bind national official hands, and that the
rule is rigid and unremitting in the face of changing circumstances and the need for
particular exceptions. Any jurist or legal scholar knows better; but many others do
not.
Id.
27. "When one looks at the history of England over the last thousand years, I think that
the evolutionary hypothesis from power to rule can be supported." Id. at 99.
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28
activity in relation to the rule.

In sum, from the public-choice point of view, the "rule-based" system is
transparent par excellence in the sense that it is an effort to get rid of the
political elements.
B.

Adjudication and Rule-application

In the context of United States domestic debate, the judiciary is
perceived by public-choice theorists as somewhat immune from
pressure politics, and thus better qualified than the regulatory agencies
to enforce the law. 29 This is also consistent with the rule-based lEO
under GATT/WTO which is also based upon the assumption that a
judicial approach in dispute settlement somehow represents the "rulebased" institution that would be able to clear up the stumbling blocks
that would be otherwise justified by the vested-interests in the powerbased system, and achieve global efficiency. Closely related to his
skepticism against regulatory state in national economy, Jan Tumlir, the
Director of the Economic Research and Analysis Division at GATT
from 1967 to 1985, was equally skeptical of the regulatory approach on
the international level, 30 rather, he expected that in the domestic system
the judiciary would be more active in scrutinizing government foreign
trade policy. 3 1 Tumlir noted that a key problem with the GATT system,

a "crucial weakness," was its "inability to provide an authoritative

28. Id.at 101.
29. E.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,

INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION (1987);

Erwin

Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103
HARV. L. REV. 43 (1989); William Landes & Richard Posner, The Independent Judiciary in

an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975); William H. Riker & Barry R.
Weingast, ConstitutionalRegulation of Legislative Choice: The Political Consequences of
Judicial Deference to Legislators, 74 VA. L. REV. 373 (1988) (arguing against judicial
deference). For critique of this view, see NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:
CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994); NEIL K. KOMESAR,
LAW'S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS (2001); Einer R.

Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review? 101 YALE
L.J. 31 (1991); Thomas W. Merrill, Does Public Choice Theory Justify Judicial Activism
After All, 21 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 219 (1997).
30. Jan Tumlir, InternationalEconomic Order: Rules, Cooperationand Sovereignty, in
ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 1, 10 (Peter Oppenheimer ed., 1978) [hereinafter

Rules, Cooperation and Sovereignty]. See also Jan Tumlir, Need for an Open Multilateral
Trading System, 6 WORLD ECON. 393 (1983).
31. "Even those demanding a world government tomorrow would probably agree that
the judicial approach to it is more promising than the executive one." Rules, Cooperation

and Sovereignty, supra note 30, at 12.
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interpretation of its rules., 32 "The post-World War II order failed
because it failed to provide for an authoritative interpretation of its
rules."33 On this point, Tumlir spoke for a large number of trade
economists and international lawyers.34 Petersmann shared Tumlir's
views on adjudication, though with a much stronger internationalist
flavor. In the 1980s, while he was the Legal Officer at GATT,
Petersmann's main policy suggestion was that GATT rules be applied by
the ECJ directly on the European Community level,35 serving a "domestic
policy function," 36 which was sometimes also called "constitutional

function." The terminology is not accidental, Tumlir called economic
policy in the 1980s a "constitutional problem." 37 With explicit reference
to Tumlir, Petersmann argued in 1983 that GATT rules "can ... be seen

as a 'second line of domestic constitutional entrenchment' and also
function so as to obligate governments to act in their national self-interest
and to protect legitimate interests of private citizens.

38

The ideas of

constitutional function of GATT according to Tumlir and Petersmann

32. Jan Tumlir, International Economic Order and Democratic Constitutionalism, 34
ORDO: JAHRBUCH FU]R DIE ORDNUNG VON WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT 71, 81 (1983)

[hereinafter InternationalEconomic Order and Democratic Constitutionalism].
33. Rules, Cooperationand Sovereignty, supra note 30, at 9.
34. One distinction should be made clear, however. Tumlir was closer to Wilhelm
R6pke in his idea of a spontaneous international order based upon a national judiciary
willing to enforce international law within its own jurisdiction. What was in Tumlir's mind
was self-execution of the international treaties by national courts: "On[e] can imagine the
international economic policy commitments of a government to be undertaken in the form
of self-executing or directly effective treaty provisions, creating immediate private rights
enforceable against one's own government to the order established or contemplated by the
treaty .... " InternationalEconomic Order and Democratic Constitutionalism, supra note
32, at 82. For that matter, Tumlir disagreed with John Jackson and other mainstream
international lawyers' efforts to establish an international order through a stronger
international organization, which the WTO embodies. See Jan Tumlir, Conceptions of the
InternationalEconomic and Legal Order, 8 WORLD ECON. 85 (1985) (reviewing Jackson et
al., Implementing the Tokyo Round, 1984).
35. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Application of GATT by the Court of Justice of the
European Communities, 20 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 397 (Oct. 1983) [hereinafter Application
of GAT by the Court of Justice]; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Internationaland European
Foreign Trade Law: GAIT Dispute Settlement Proceedings against the EEC, 22 COMM.
MKT. L. REV. 441 (1985).
36. Ernst-Ulrich Petersman, Trade Policy as a Constitutional Problem: On the
"Domestic Policy Functions" of InternationalTrade Rules, 41 Swiss REV. INT'L ECON. REL.
405 (1986) [hereinafter Trade Policy as a Constitutional Problem]; Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, The EEC as a GATT Member-Legal Conflicts between GAIT Law and
European Community Law, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT 23 (Meinhard Hilf et.
Al. eds., 1986).
37. JAN TUMLIR, ECONOMIC POLICY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL

PROBLEM (1984); Jan

Tumlir, InternationalEconomic Order and Democratic Constitutionalism,supra note 32.
38. Application of GATT by the Court of Justice, supra note 35, at 42.
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were inherited from the ordo-liberalism, represented by the early Hayek,
Ludwig von Mises, Walter Eucken and Franz B6hm, and that heritage is
acknowledged. 39 Eucken and B6hm, for example, advocated a notion of
an "economic constitution" in the 1930s in their debate about state control
of the economy.4 °
Today this idea of constitutional function is pretty much alive, as
can be seen in Petersmann's
relentless
advocacy for
constitutionalization of the WTO, which is a refurbished version of his
ideas of the 1980s. Whether the slogan is constitutional function or
constitutionalization, the idea is heavily dependent on a presumed but
untested connection between adjudication and rule-application. Of
course, none of the GATT/WTO architects single-handedly created this
mythology; it is rather widely shared. The excitement about a "great
transformation" from GATT diplomacy to a court-like judicial dispute
settlement in the WTO suggests a perhaps unrealistically high
expectation from the judicial approach.41 Interestingly, however, this
presumption is somehow accepted by some of WTO's most ardent
critics. At the turn of the century, the newly established WTO is seen as
an icon for both global capitalism and secrecy-the behind-the-door
negotiations.42 One common strategy for some of the environmental
groups, labor unions, and human rights groups was to demand that they
should be able to take part in the WTO dispute settlement process.4 3

39. Trade Policy as a ConstitutionalProblem,supra note 36, at 413-14.
40. The most well-known perhaps is a manifesto made in 1936, see Franz B6hm,
Walter Eucken & Hans Grossmann-Doerth, The Ordo Manifesto of 1936, in GERMANY'S
SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY: ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION 15-26 (Alan Peacock & Hans
Willgerodt eds., 1989). For the ordo-liberalism, see RAZEEN SALLY, CLASSICAL LIBERALISM
AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: STUDIES IN THEORY AND INTELLECTUAL HISTORY

(1998), especially Part III of the book.
41. See, e.g., Joseph H. H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats:
Reflections on WTO Dispute Settlement, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY: THE
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 334 (Roger Porter, Pierre Sauv6,
Arvind Subramanian & Americo Beviglia Zampetti eds., 2001) [hereinafter EFFICIENCY,
EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY].

42. Clueless in Seattle, ECONOMIST, Dec. 4, 1999, at 17; New Trade War, ECONOMIST,

Dec. 4, 1999, at 25; Thomas Friedman, Op-Ed., Senseless in Seattle, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1,
1999, at A23; Leslie Wayne, For Trade Protester, "Slower, Sadder Songs, " N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 28, 2001, § 3, at 1; Leslie Wayne, Genoa on Minds of Protesters;Activists in a Populist
Movement that Besieged Seattle in 1999 are Mobilizing Europeans Against Globalization at
this Week's G-8 Summit, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 2001, at 1.
43. Daniel C. Esty, We the People: Civil Society and the World Trade Organization,in
NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN H.

JACKSON 87 (2000) (hereinafter NEW DIRECTIONS]; Steve Charnovitz, Opening the WTO to
Nongovernmental Interests, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 173 (2000); Steve Charnovitz,
Participationof Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade Organization, 17 U.
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Thus, these radical critics of the WTO actually tend to share and
reinforce the fantasy about adjudicatory process, the idea of "public
advocacy." In response, the WTO has opened its proceedings to NGOs
on two occasions.4 4 Based upon similar assumptions about judicial

transparency, proposals are also being made to let the private parties
take part in the WTO dispute settlement process.45
C.

Textualism in Adjudication

At the center of the theory of adjudication in the "rule-based" lEO
lies emphasis on textualist and literal reading of the GATT/WTO
agreements. Public-choice theory of legislative and policymaking
process stresses that the consent reached in the democratic process is
more the result of countless bargains than a consensus or even a genuine
agreement.46 Following this line of thinking, one can hardly claim a
collective mind in the legislature or public authority, let alone the
"legislative intent." Thus, when talking about law, what we have is what
you see in our hands: the rules themselves. The most classic statement
of this view is perhaps that offered by the public-choice-inspired Justice
Antonin Scalia of the United States Supreme Court: "The rule of law
means the law of rules. ' ' 7 As I will argue elsewhere, in jurisprudence,
the intellectual movement of the "rule-based" lEO in the framework of
GATT/WTO is an integral part of this broader movement, and the major
architects of GATT in the 1980s were influenced by the same group of
economists in public-choice
and ordo-liberalism, 48 though,
understandably, with its own characters. Not without irony, the

PA. J. INT'L L. 331 (1996); Steve Charnovitz, WTO Cosmopolitics, 34 N.Y.U. J.INT'L L. &
POL. 299 (2002); Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization

Disputes to Non-government Parties, 17 U. PA. J.INT'L ECON. L. 295 (1996); John A.
Ragosta, Unmasking the WTO-Access to the DSB System: Can the WTO DSB Live up to

the Moniker "World Trade Court"?, 31 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 739 (2000).
44. Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibitionof Certain Shrimp and

Shrimp Products (AB-1998-4), WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter
Shrimp/Turtle]; Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and

Asbestos-containingProducts,WT/DS 135/R (Sept. 18, 2000).
45. Sungjoon Cho, GATT Non-violation Issues in the WTO Framework: Are They the
Achilles' Heel of the Dispute Settlement Process?, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 311, 347-50 (1998);
Glen T. Schleyer, Power to the People: Allowing PrivateParties to Raise Claims Before the

WTO Dispute Resolution System, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 2275 (1997)

(arguing for

participation by private parties in the non-violation cases).
46. JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962).

47. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175
(1989).
48. Zang, supra note 13.
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seemingly ambitious theory of the "rule-based" lEO ends up grounding
itself upon a surprisingly meager understanding of the rules: textualism.
Parts II and III of this article will show textualism as a

jurisprudential canon, and how the debate about its legitimacy is played
out in real cases. Though advocates of the "rule-based" IEO are often
silent about the fact that there are different ways of reading the rules, I
will show two forms of textualism in action: the exclusionary textualism

during the GATT period and the semantic textualism in WTO.
II.

THE GATT EXCLUSIONARY TEXTUALISM

Interpretation was not a difficult task in the early days of GATT

operation, when the GATT negotiators were still around and their
memories fresh. 49 Nor did this question become acute until in the 1980s,
shortly after, the Vienna Convention entered into force. Over time, GATT
gradually formed its own way of reading the GATT text in a fashion that
can be characterized as "exclusionary textualism," which stressed that
GATT panels only looked at the GATT text and would not recognize any

other factors beyond that. Exclusionary textualism differs from semantic
textualism, which will be discussed in Part III. For exclusionary
textualism, the focal issue was about the relationship between the text and
extra-text, and the core legal and policy issue was whether a GATT panel
should disregard concerns outside the text of GATT agreements. Both
proponents and opponents of exclusionary textualism accepted that what

was in question was not the text itself, not the semantics. Thus, Philip M.
49. Indian Export Rebates (1948), one of the earliest cases, where the Chairman of
GATT, Mr. Wilgress, was asked to interpret Article I of GATT 1947. Application Article
1:1 to Rebates on Internal Taxes, GATT/CP.2/SR. 11, ruling by the Chairman on Aug. 24,
1948, reproduced in GATT B.I.S.D. I112 (1950). As Hudec noted, neither the Chairman
nor his advisors were approaching the question under strict canons of interpretation. Hudec
explained:
It is not difficult to see why. The Chairman was, after all, one of the authors of the
text in question. And so, for that matter, were most of the Secretariat officials and
the other delegates in the room. No matter how hard they might try to look at the
bare text alone in this situation, it was inevitable that everyone's interpretation
would be dominated by their own highly authoritative recollection of what they "had
meant to say." The chairman knew they meant to cover this sort of thing, and one
look around the room would have produced nods to the same effect from all the
leading draftsmen.
ROBERT HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE Diplomacy 103 (1975). See

also, PAR HALLSTROM, THE GATT PANELS AND THE FORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW (1994); Robert E. Hudec, GATT or GABB? The Future Design of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 80 YALE L. J. 1299 (1971); Robert E. Hudec, The GATT
Legal System: A Diplomat's Jurisprudence, 4 J. WORLD TRADE L. 615 (1970); Pierre
Pescatore, The GATT Dispute Settlement Mechanism-It's Present Situation and Its
Prospects, 27 J. WORLD TRADE 5 (1993).
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Nichols was right in noting that in GATT, "[flor the most part these
[GATT] panels avoided overly literal interpretations, relying instead on
'natural,' 'normal,' or 'generally understood' meanings of words. 5 °
Semantic textualism, which emphasizes literal meaning of the
GATT/WTO agreements, developed later.
A.

The InstitutionalSetting

In an official description of the practice of dispute settlement under
the GATT framework, Agreed Description of the Customary Practiceof
the GATT in the Field of Dispute Settlement (Article XXIl.'2), it was
recognized that, "[t]he function of a panel has normally been to review
the facts of a case and the applicabilityof GA TTprovisions and to arrive
at an objective assessment of these matters."'', The focus on the text of
the GATT agreement partially explains the 1982 Ministerial
Declaration;it was even added that, "[i]t is understood that decisions in
this [dispute settlement] process cannot add to or diminish the rights and
obligations provided in the General Agreement., 52 In a GATT Council
meeting on Canada-FIRA (1983), 53 when a number of delegations
expressed doubts that the GATT panel had the competence to handle a
case in which an investment legislation was in question, the GATT
Council decided that, "the Panel would be limited in its activities and
findings to within the four corners of GATT. 54 Frieder Roessler has
noted that the claim of competence in the jurisprudence of GATT was a
sensitive matter.55 Roessler, who was working for the World Bank at the
time and who eventually served as Director of Legal Affairs in the
GATT Secretariat from 1989 to 1995, was probably speaking with an
insider's tone. Thus, at the outset, textualism was often meant to be a
gesture of courtesy and respect to domestic trade policy. What is
interesting, however, is that, ironically perhaps, both the "hostility"
(from the public-choice economics) and the "benevolence" (from the

50. Philip M. Nichols, GA TDoctrine,36 VA. J. INT'L L. 379, 423 (1996).
51. Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and
Surveillance, Agreed Description of the Customary Practice of the GATT in the Field of
Dispute Settlement (Article XXIII:2) Annex, L/4907 (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT B.I.S.D. (26th
Supp.), at 210-18 (1980) (emphasis added).
52. MinisterialDeclaration,L/5424 (Nov. 29, 1982), GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.), at
9-23 (1983) [hereinafter MinisterialDeclaration].
53. GATT Panel Report, Canada-Administrationof the ForeignInvestment Review Act,

L/5504 (Feb. 7, 1984), GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 140 (1984) [hereinafter CanadaFIRA].
54. Id. para. 1.4.
55. See Frieder Roessler, The Competence of GATT, 21 J. WORLD TRADE L. 73 (1987).
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institutional design) converge on the textualism approach, and they even
worked together in their disregard of the public-policy concerns.
In 1982, at the GATT ministerial meeting in Geneva, the
Contracting Parties, having determined to address the concerns over
growing protectionism and crisis of the world trading system, 56 decided
to set up a group of experts to review and compile information about
existing quantitative restrictions. The group, which was later called the
Group on Quantitative Restrictions and Other Non-Tariff Barriers under
the chairmanship of Ambassador A. Onkelinx (Belgium), met regularly
in 1983 and 1984, and finished its first report to the ContractingParties
in November 1984, Report (1984). This report recorded controversies
among GATT members regarding legality of quantitative restrictions:
some members raised concerns that the non-tariff measures were based
on historical and socio-cultural grounds, while others insisted that those
elements were irrelevant.58 Noting the diverging views of the members,
Chairman Onkelinx suggested that the "working hypothesis" was that a
quantitative restriction was presumed not in conformity with GATT
until a GATT justification was offered:
The fact that no GATT article or provision had been cited to justify
the existence of a quantitative restriction should not ipso facto signify
that the restriction was not in conformity with the GATT. However, in
the context of the Group's work, it was the responsibility of
contracting parties maintaining quantitative restrictions to cite GATT
justifications for them if they wished to argue that they were in
conformity with the GATT. Accordingly, if no GATT justification
were advanced, the working hypothesis59 would be that the measures
were not in conformity with the GATT.

56. MinisterialDeclaration,supra note 52, para. 1.
57. Report (1984) of the Group on Quantitative Restrictions and other Non-Tariff
Barriers,L/5713 (Nov. 30, 1984), GATT B.I.S.D. (31st Supp.) at 211-28 (1985) [hereinafter
Report (1984)].
58. The Report (1984) noted,

Many contracting parties gave specific economic and socio-cultural grounds for the
maintenance of their quantitative restrictions. Some delegations believed that the
grounds and GATT conformity of quantitative restrictions could only be seen in the

context of the history of discussion, consultation and negotiations on quantitative
restrictions since the early days of GATT and that, as on past occasions, due account
would have to be taken of the historical, economic and socio-cultural situation in
each sector.
Id. para. 19.
59. Id. para. 23.
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This "working hypothesis," which privileged textuality of the legal
rules, was reached in the context of heated debate among GATT
member-countries about the role of GATT dispute settlement and the
nature of the IEO. The first thing textualism did was to silence the other
side in the debate.
B.

Excluding Domestic Public Policy Concerns

While Onkelinx's group was still working on the Report (1984),
the United Kingdom delegation (on behalf of Hong Kong), filed a
complaint in EC-Imports from Hong Kong (1983)60 against some
French quantitative import restrictions imposed on Hong Kong products
for violation of GATT Article XI: 1, which prohibited quantitative
restriction. 6 1 The European Community (EC), speaking for France in
this case, argued that "in order to judge the compatibility of these
restrictions with the provisions of GATT, it was not enough to limit
examination to a purely legal exercise. ' 62 EC stressed that many of the
restrictive measures were historical, cultural, and social policy reasons,
thus, "... judgment that would be isolated from any economic
consideration and from the real factors of commercial policy, would be
contrary to the pragmatic approach that was traditional in GATT. ' 63 The
GATT panel disagreed; in reaching its conclusion, it adopted an
exclusionary textualist approach in finding that EC's arguments were
largely irrelevant:
The Panel considered the arguments put forward by the European
Community regarding the social and economic conditions which
prevailed in the various product categories under examination. The
European Community did not claim any corresponding GATT
provision in justification for these arguments. The Panel was of the
opinion that such matters did not come within the purview of
Articles XI and XIII of the GATT, and in this instance concluded that

60. GATT Panel Report, Panel on Quantitative Restrictions against Imports of Certain
Productsfrom Hong Kong, L/551 1 (July 12, 1983), GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 129 (1984)
[hereinafter EC-Importsfrom Hong Kong].
61. GATT Article XI: 1 provided,
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether
made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be
instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product
of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export
of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
62. EC-Importsfrom Hong Kong, supra note 60, 12.
63. Id.

408

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Corn.

[Vol. 33:393

64
they lay outside its consideration.

On another occasion, the EC tried to make a legal argument against the
panel's approach. EC argued that in international law, there is a principle
of "the law-creating force derived from circumstances., 65 However, this
argument only suggested how ill prepared the EC was at the time-they
had not realized the unfolding GATT jurisprudence was both exclusive
and textualist. Here is the reasoning of the GATT panel, sticking to its

exclusionary textualist approach:
The Panel considered the argument put forward by the European
Communities that the principle referred to as "the law-creating force
derived from circumstances" could be relevant in the absence of law.
It found, however, that in the present case such a situation did not
exist, and the matter was to be considered
strictly in the light of the
66
provisionsof the General Agreement.

And yet, the best example in the GATT panel discussion is Leather
111 (1984).67 In question were import restrictions (import quota and

licensing requirements) maintained by Japan's Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI) on certain leather and leather products from

the United States. The complaint was that the import restriction violated
GATT Article XI: 1.A crucial difference with EC-Importsfrom Hong

Kong (1983) was that the import restriction in question was not based
upon commercial policy consideration, rather it was a social policy
designed to protect a historically discriminated social group. Thus, the

Leather III (1984) case was a good test of the GATT doctrine in its
exclusionary and textual reading of the GATT agreements. The GATT

64. Id. 27 (emphasis added).
65. The EC argued,
Leaving aside the fact that the contracting parties had developed in practice a certain
attitude of tolerance in regard to existing quantitative restrictions, but outside the
framework of specific provisions, it was suggested that the Panel could not ignore
that the General Agreement was an international agreement which had to be
interpreted on the basis of generally accepted principles and practices of
international law. An important principle of international law, namely "the
law-creating force derived from circumstances" could not be ignored by the Panel,
on the sole ground that no GATT article provided for such a principle.

Id.

15.

66. Id. 29 (emphasis added).
67. Report of the Panel, Japanese Measures on Imports of Leather, L/5623 (May 16,
1984) GATT B.I.S.D. (31 th Supp.) at 94 (1984) [hereinafter Leather111].
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panel stated:
The Panel considered that the special historical, cultural, and
socio-economic circumstances referred to by Japan could not be taken
into account by it in this context since its terms of reference were to
examine the matter "in the light of the relevant GATT provisions" and
these provisions did not provide such a justification for import
restrictions.... The Panel therefore found that the Japanese import
restrictions at issue, made effective through quotas and import
licenses, contravened Article XI: 1. (Emphasis added).6 8
This is one of the early cases where the "trade and.. ." issue was raised.
From its legal reasoning, we can see the Panel members knew they were
making a difficult decision; 69 thus they felt the need to provide a
justification of it. Ultimately, the Panel chose a legal argument based on
the GATT practice of exclusionary textualism where everything outside
of the GATT agreement is irrelevant.
In cases where environment or social policy was related, the GATT
panels chose not to touch upon them. In US-Superfund Act (1987),7 °
the GATT panel decided not to consider the objectives of U.S.
environmental law on the ground that it went beyond its mandate:
The mandate of the Panel is to examine the case before it "in the light
of the relevant GATT provisions" (paragraph 1.4 above). The Panel
therefore did not examine the consistency of the revenue provisions in
the Superfund Act with the environmental
objectives of that Act or
71
with the Polluter-Pays Principle.
Having noted that the Contracting Parties had established in 1972 a
Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade, and "[t]his
Group has never met but still exists, 7 2 nevertheless, the GATT Panel
decided that, "[t]he EEC [European Economic Community] would thus
68. Id. 44. Similar views can be found in 127.
69. The GATT panel noted, "The Panel appreciated the difficult socio-economic
situation of the Japanese leather industry and the particularly sensitive problem of the ddwa
population." Id. 43.
70. Report of the Panel, United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported
Substances, L/6175 (June 17, 1987), GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 136 (1987) [hereinafter
US-Superfund Act].
71. Id. 5.2.6. See also PAR HALLSTROM, supra note 49, at 94 (discussing the USSuperfundAct case).
72. US-SuperfundAct, supranote 70, 5.2.6.
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have a forum available in the GATT in which to pursue the
environmental issues
which the Panel, because of its limited mandate,
73
could not address.

It should be noted, however, that so far none of the GATT panels
we have discussed had invoked the Vienna Convention for support of
their exclusionary textualism, though in theory, it had been available
after 1980 when it entered into force. This suggests that the GATT
exclusionary textualism originated from its own practice and underlying
assumptions. Not until the conflict between trade and non-trade issues
became intensified did GATT panels begin to look to the Vienna
Convention as an authority in support of its legitimacy.74 In a sense,
exclusionary textualism fit both the public-choice distrust of domestic
trade policy and its own institutional "modesty" equally well. Thus,
from the very beginning, textualism works both ways: it can be on the
"offensive," by extracting a laissez-faire philosophy from the text and
enforcing it in disregard of social contexts of both the formation of the
text and the specific circumstances in which the text is enforced; it can
also be "defensive," by insisting that it is within the "four comers" of
the text. The two elements worked hand in hand, and both elements
were equally real.
C.

Excluding Other InternationalAgreements

During the Uruguay Round, the GATT panels were also asked to
address the relations between trade and some international agreements
on environment. However, to the dismay of the environmentalists and
international lawyers,75 the GATT panels tended to exclude
international treaties or agreements, and their reasoning had a lot to do
with exclusionary textualism. In Canada-Herring(1987),76 a Canadian

73. Id.
74. See infra text accompanying notes 112-43.
75. Betsy Baker, Protection, Not Protectionism: Multilateral Environmental
Agreements and the GATT, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 437 (1993); Steve Charnovitz,
Environmentalism Confronts GATT Rules-Recent Developments and New Opportunities,
27 J. WORLD TRADE 37 (1993) [hereinafter Environmentalism Confronts GATTRules]; Peter
L. Lallas, Daniel C. Esty & David J. van Hoogstraten, Environmental Protection and
InternationalTrade: Toward Mutually Supportive Rules and Policies, 16 HARv. ENvTL. L.
REV. 271 (1992); DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE
FuTuRE (1994) [hereinafter, GREENING THE GATT]; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Trade and
Environment: An Environmentalist View, 86 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 241 (1992); RALPH
NADER, ET AL., THE CASE AGAINST FREE TRADE: GATT, NAFTA, AND THE GLOBALIZATION
OF CORPORATE POWER (1993).

76. Report of the Panel, Canada-MeasuresAffecting Exports of UnprocessedHerring
and Salmon, L/6268 (Nov. 27, 1987), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 98 (1988) [hereinafter
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restriction on export of unprocessed herring, pink and sockeye salmon

was in question, and Canada sought justification under Articles XX(g)
and XI:2(b) of the General Agreement. Though the export restriction
was largely based on concerns of fishery resources management and
environment under domestic law, Canada also invited the GATT Panel
to consider the question that the export restriction was related to

international agreements on fisheries and the U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea.77 The GATT Panel noted this and decided summarily
that it would not look into those issues, for reason of its limited
competence:
Canada referred in its submission to international agreements on
fisheries and the Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Panel
considered that its mandate was limited to the examination of
Canada's measures in the light of the relevant provisions of the
General Agreement. This
report therefore has no bearing on questions
78
of fisheries jurisdiction.

The last sentence is familiar: in an earlier report which is related to tuna,
a GATT Panel also managed to avoid taking a position on matters of
fisheries jurisdiction. 79 Again, that decision was based, though
implicitly, upon the concern of the GATT Panel's competence.
A similar strategy was also adopted by the GATT Panel in

Tuna/Dolphin 1 (1991),80 where the United States sought to link GATT
Article XX with international agreements such as the Convention on
Canada-Herring].
77. The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/122; 21 I.L.M. 1261 (Nov. 16, 1994). The GATT panel recorded:
Canada had noted the long history of bilateral relations between Canada and the
United States on Pacific fisheries matters, such as related international agreements
including the 1952 International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North
Pacific, as amended in 1979 and 1986, and the 1985 Treaty between the
Governments of Canada and the United States concerning Pacific salmon. Canada
had also noted the relevance of principles applying to fisheries conservation, and
relevant measures as embodied in various provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Id. para. 3.39.
78. Canada-Herring,supranote 76, para. 5.3.
79. Report of the Panel, United States-Prohibitionof Imports of Tuna and Tuna
Productsfrom Canada, L/5198 (Dec. 22, 1981), GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 91 (1982)
[hereinafter U.S.-Tunafrom Canada].
80. Report of the Panel, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M.
1594 (Nov. 29,1991), GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155-205 (1993) unadopted, DS21/R
[hereinafter Tuna/DolphinI].
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International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES), the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea and the work of
the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission. 8 1 But the GATT Panel
did not considered it in its findings. In Tuna/Dolphin 11 (1994),82 both
the Vienna Convention and the environmental treaties became focal
issues between the U.S. on the one hand, and EEC and the Netherlands
on the other. The U.S. argued that international treaties constituted the
"subsequent practices" under Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna
Convention 83 and therefore should come to the aid in interpreting
paragraphs (g) and (b) of GATT Article XX; 84 while the EEC and the
Netherlands counter-argued that the environmental treaties did not meet
the standard required by Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention
because they were not entered into by all the parties to GATT.85 Facing
this tough question, the GATT panel found the treaty interpretation rule
in the Vienna Convention was perhaps the least controversial part of the
case, "[t]he Panel recalled that it is generally accepted that the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties expresses the basic rules of treaty
interpretation .... ",86This seems to be the first time a GATT Panel had
expressively confirmed the role of the Vienna Convention. 87 The GATT
Panel decided that, "it was first of all necessary to determine the extent
to which these treaties were relevant to the interpretation of the text of
the General Agreement., 88 After some brief discussions, the Panel
concluded that those treaties were not relevant for the purpose of
interpreting Article XX of GATT:
81. Id.
3.36 and 3.40.
82. Report of the Panel, United States-Restrictionson Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839
(June 16, 1994), GATTPD LEXIS 11 (1994) unadopted, DS29/R [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin
83. Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention, supra note 9, provides,
There shall be taken into account, together with the context,
(3) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which established the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.
84. Tuna/DolphinIf, supra note 82, 9 3.21-26.
85. Id.
3.39-42.
86. Id.
5.18. See also Report of the Panel, EC-mposition of Anti-dumping Duties
on Imports of Cotton Yarn From Brazil, GATT ADP/137 (Oct. 30, 1995) para. 540ff.

Nichols, supra note 50, at 422-30 (discussing GATT's practice in interpretation of
documents); PAR HALLSTROM, supra note 49, at 172.
87. In a previous decision, Tuna/DolphinI, supra note 80, the Vienna Convention was
not even mentioned. In Banana I, GATT Panel Report, EEC-Member States' Import
Regimes for Bananas, DS32/R (un-adopted), June 3, 1993, reprinted in 1993 GATTPD

LEXIS 11, EEC made some of its arguments based upon the rules of interpretation in the
Vienna Convention, but the issue was not discussed by the panel.
88. Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 82,

5.18.
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However, the Panel noted that practice under the bilateral and
plurilateral treaties cited could not be taken as practice under the
General Agreement, and therefore could not affect the interpretation of
it. The Panel therefore found that under the general rule contained in
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, these treaties were not relevant
as a primary
means of interpretation of the text of the General
8
Agreement.
Thus, the GATT Panel relieved itself from any responsibility of taking
international agreements into consideration. Jackson believed that the
GATT panel in Tuna/Dolphin was in fact "praiseworthy": "It suggests a
certain amount of 'judicial restraint."' 90 Most of the GATT panelists,
economists and international lawyers, were fully aware of the tension
between public policy and free trade, but eventually, the formalinstitutional reasons overcame the tension.
In sum, from the mid 1980s to the early 1990s, exclusionary
textualism as a jurisprudential doctrine in the "rule-based" IEO served
three functions: as a gesture of courtesy and modesty, exclusionary
textualism represents self-restraint on the part of GATT, in the sense
that it does not step beyond the "four-corners" of the General
Agreement; as a gesture of professionalism, it acts and thinks "like a
lawyer" in its employment of legal terms such as "competence"; as a
jurisprudential justification of the GATT decisions, and the response to
the social groups, it is a denial of choice, both in form and in substance.
It excluded the participation of social groups contesting the legitimacy
of the world trading system. The irony is that when the economists and
international lawyers talked about GATT as a "public institution,"
inspired by public-choice economics, they meant "public institution."

III. THE WTO SEMANTIC TEXTUALISM
The establishment of the WTO in 1994 means a transformation of
its dispute settlement mechanism, though this change is often
overstated: the rules under WTO become much more detailed; members
of WTO increased, and their interests, economic situations, their
expectations, are much more diversified; the range of trade agreements
expanded tremendously. Therefore, from time to time, WTO dispute
89. Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 82, 5.19.
90. John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or
Conflict? 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1227, 1254 (1992) [hereinafter Congruence or
Conflict?].
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settlement continues to handle hotly debated cases, and therefore face
much more political pressure from all directions. The composition of the
panels also changed. More panelists with legal training are serving on the
bench than before, 9' and these panelists tend to show more respect to the
scholarship in international law in general.92 With all these changes, the
WTO dispute settlement system is made more judicialized, as the "rulebased" lEO has been demanding. Even though, at least in its early years,
the dispute settlement mechanism was not intended to be a rigid and
formalistic enforcement mechanism; rather, the idea was to make it a
workable process with both strength and flexibility. The best statement of
this philosophy is made by the AB in Japan-Alcoholic Beverages II
(1996), 93 when commenting on the role of the WTO dispute settlement
in the world trading system in general:
WTO rules are reliable, comprehensible and enforceable. WTO rules
are not so rigid or so inflexible as not to leave room for reasoned
judgments in confronting the endless and ever-changing ebb and flow
of real facts in real cases in the real world. They will serve the
multilateral trading system best if they are interpreted with that in
mind. In that way, we will achieve the "security and predictability"
sought for the multilateral trading system by the Members of
94 the WTO
through the establishment of the dispute settlement system.
In the cases of 1996 and 1997, including the most controversial cases
such as Bananas 111 (1997), 95 or Hormones 111 (1998),96 dictionaries

91. See Terence P. Stewart and Mara M. Burr, The WTO PanelProcess: An Evaluation
of the First Three Years, 32 INT'L LAW. 709 (1998) (symposium on the first three years of
the WTO dispute settlement system).
92. David Palmeter and Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law,
92 Am. J. Int'l L. 398 (1998). Palmeter and Mavroidis noted that, generally, WTO DSB
tend to pay more attention to the scholarly works than the GATT panels; interestingly
enough, within the WTO DSB, the Appellate Body tended to cite more scholarly works than
the panels. Id. at 405-06.
93. Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxeson Alcoholic Beverages WT/DS8/AB/R (Oct.
4, 1996) (adoptedNov. 1, 1996) [hereinafter Japan-AlcoholicBeverages 11].
94. See Id. text accompanying note 67.
95. Panel Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/R (May 22, 1997) [hereinafter Bananas Ill
(WT/DS27/R, 1997)], and its subsequent Appellate Body Report, European CommunitiesRegime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9,
1997) (adopted Sept. 25, 1997) [hereinafter Bananas 111 (WT/DS27/AB/R, 1997)].
96. Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), WT/DS48/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (adoptedFeb. 13, 1998) [hereinafter Hormones

111].
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were used only occasionally. However, over time, this good intention
became unstable. The WTO continues to face tough questions, to make
difficult choices between free trade and public policy issues; and, from
time to time, it finds itself under pressure to justify its decisions.
Therefore, it leans more and more to textualism; but this time, it is
textualism of a different kind-the semantic textualism.
For the WTO panels and its newly established AB, legal
argumentation has moved from the limits of competence during the
GATT period, as the core of the exclusionary textualism, to a new
battlefield-the semantics, i.e., analysis of the language of the WTO
texts. The most direct legal basis for this move, discussed in Section B
of this Part, is that the Vienna Convention became legally applicable
(unlike the case of the GATT period) and Article 31(1) of the Vienna
Convention prescribes a fundamental rule of treaty interpretation:
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms97of the treaty in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose.
As can be seen shortly, a large number of WTO cases and the
controversy over them center on the question of "ordinary meaning."
Thus, the essential semantic question is how to find the "ordinary
meaning" in the WTO texts. For that purpose, this Part of the article
documents two forms of semantic textualism: the dictionary approach
(in Section C), and the intratextual approach (in Section D). My
argument is that, in leaning towards semantic textualism, the WTO
dispute settlement mechanism gradually loses sight of the initial
objective it set forth for itself in Japan-AlcoholicBeverages 11 (1996),
and its legal reasoning becomes formalistic. Before the discussion of the
Vienna Convention and its role in WTO jurisprudence, it is important to
look into the way in which the WTO cut off its connection with
history-the drafting history, as the starting point of its semantic
textualism.
A.

DraftingHistory

Earlier, I have briefly alluded to how the public-choice economics
98
undermines the idea of "legislative intent" in general jurisprudence.
The influence of public-choice theory can be seen in the perception of

97. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 9, art. 31 (1).
98. See supra text accompanying note 46.
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drafting history of international trade agreements, which became
relevant when GATT was challenged by social groups during the
Uruguay Round negotiations. It should be made clear that in GATT
history, drafting history was only occasionally discussed, therefore, it
had never been heavily relied upon in the first place. In the early 1990s,
drafting history was used by GATT panels to justify a narrow
interpretation of Article XI and the Article XX exceptions. In Thai
Cigarettes (1990), for example, the GATT Panel used drafting history
to interpret the meaning of "agricultural or fisheries product" under
Article XI:2(c)(1). 99 In Tuna/Dolphin 1 (1991), discussed earlier, the
GATT Panel used drafting history to narrow down the exceptions under
Article XX(b) and (g) and concluded that protection of animal or plant
life or health are only within the jurisdiction of the importing country. 10 0
In response, Charnovitz did detailed historical research on Article
XX," 1" and found that the drafting history of the General Agreement,
dating back to the international convention of 1927 and the International
Trade Organization (ITO) draft charters, did not necessarily support the
narrow interpretation. Thus, Charnovitz made drafting history part of
the battle between the social groups and the free traders. If accepted, it
would be a threat to the "public institution" in the sense that the social
groups would have been able to take part in the discourse about the
meaning of the trade agreements from outside the institution. But this
was determinedly rejected by Jackson, who found Charnovitz not
persuasive enough, and then quickly suggested that drafting history be
left out of the debate:
While this view is interesting, and the research is apparently thorough,

it is not entirely persuasive and overlooks important issues of treaty
interpretation. Under typical international law, elaborated by the

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, preparatory work history
is an ancillary means of interpreting treaties. In the context of
interpreting the GATT, we have more than forty years of practice

since the origin of GATT, and we also have some very important
policy questions raised by the "slippery slope arguments" mentioned
above. Thus, unlike certain schools of thought concerning United
States Supreme Court interpretation of the United States Constitution,

99. Report of the Pannel, Thailand-Restrictionson Importation of and Internal Taxes on
Cigarettes, 69, DS10/R (Oct. 5, 1990), GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200 (1990)
[hereinafter Thai Cigarettes].
100. Tuna/DolphinI, supranote 80, 5.26 and 5.31. See Baker, supra note 75, at 457.
101. Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article AXP,
25 J. WORLD TRADE 37 (1991).
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it is this author's0 view
that one cannot rely too heavily on the original
2

drafting history.1

03
Shortly afterwards, Jackson's view was fully endorsed by Bhagwati.1
This, however, should not come as a surprise. On a deeper level,
the public-choice inspired GATT/WTO architects, like their mentors of
an earlier generation, were troubled by the drafting history of GATT.
Recall the ITO negotiation process was largely dominated by the
Keynesians in the mid 1940s and the conservative minds in economics
and trade policy were never happy about the negotiations. Jacob Viner,
the pre-World War II leader of the Chicago school in economics and
one of the mentors of the public-choice theorists, wrote a piece for
Foreign Affairs in 1947 commenting on the Suggested Charter, the
basis of ITO negotiation. And the title of this comment covers its
04
content well: "Conflicts of Principle in Drafting a Trade Charter."'
Viner pointed out,

Where rules of some degree of precision are proposed, they are
invariably qualified by exceptions and escape clauses necessary to

make them generally acceptable, but easily capable of becoming more
important than the rule to which they are attached. Where the clash of
principle is particularly sharp,...

the problem is evaded or is

postponed. In the process of evolution which the draft Charter has
already undergone, there can easily be detected a general tendency

toward blurring and relaxing its principles and rules;

Thus, the drafting history is something that the public-choice inspired
architects of GATT/WTO do not want to face, just like the publicchoice-inspired lawyers in the U.S. do not want to face the legal history
around or after the New Deal.10 6 In a sense, textualism is exactly
something that can help them out of the historical trap. But it remains an
open question whether the denial of the historical context is one way of
102. Congruence or Conflict?, supra note 90, at 1241-43.
103. Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade and the Environment: The False Conflict? in TRADE AND
THE ENVIRONMENT: LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLICY 159, 175 (Durwood Zaelke et. al. eds.,
1993) (discussing Charnovitz and Jackson's critique of original intent).
104. JACOB VINER, Conflicts of Principle in Drafting a Trade Charter (1947), reprinted
in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 351-66 (1951).

105. Id. at 365.
106. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE NEW RIGHT AND THE CONSTITUTION: TURNING BACK
THE LEGAL CLOCK (1990) (discussing Richard Epstein, Bernard H. Siegan, Richard Posner,
and Justice Scalia, among others).
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denying the text itself.
As with the exclusionary textualism in general, the debate on
drafting history was not entirely based on theoretical concerns; it also
has its "benevolence" aspect, which, again, works hand in hand with the
distrust based on public-choice economics. In a Geneva Global
Arbitration Forum shortly after the WTO was established, Canadian
practitioner Christopher Thomas presented the idea that taking the text
of WTO agreements seriously is a matter of due process. 10 7 Negotiating
history would not help much because trade deals are normally struck
amongst a small number of key countries, and not everyone is in the
room at the same time. For Thomas, it would be "unfair if a State which
has not been a party to the final deal, and therefore does not really have
a sense of what was being done in that room, cannot effectively
rebut a
'' 0 8
larger power's assertion of what the negotiating history was."
In some sense, skepticism of the negotiating history and its
potential misuse presented by Thomas is largely in line with the
architects' conceptual dichotomy of power and rule. The WTO panels
and AB do not give up drafting history all together. In Gasoline (1996),
the AB relied upon drafting history to redefine the relations of the
chapeau and the exceptions of Article XX. 109 However, in general, the
negotiating history is rarely relied upon in WTO decisions. In U.S.Omnibus Appropriations Act (2002),110 the AB clearly suggests that

negotiating history does not decide the plain meaning of the text of
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPS)."'
What the WTO panels and AB found more reliable was the Vienna
Convention.
B.

The Vienna Convention

The Vienna Convention was a product of the International Law
Commission (ILC)," 12 and started its preparatory work from 1949.'13
107. J.C. Thomas, The Need for Due Process in WTO Proceedings, 31 J. WORLD
TRADE 51 (1997).
108. Id. at 49.
109. Appellate Body Report, United States-Standard for Reformulate and
Conventional Gasoline WTiDS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) (adopted May 20, 1996) [hereinafter
U.S.-Gasoline]. See supra text of the report accompanying notes 44 and 45.
110. Appellate Body Report, UnitedStates-Sections 211 Omnibus AppropriationsAct
of 1998, WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002) (adopted Feb. 1, 2002) [hereinafter U.S.Omnibus AppropriationsAct].
111. Id. 340.
112. The International Law Commission (ILC), was established in 1949 under the
United Nations. Functionally, it seems to be the post-war successor of the League of Nations
Codification Conference in the codification movement under the U.N. See, Shabtai
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While the ILC was preparing the drafts, there were largely three views
on treaty interpretation: the textual approach, which stressed the text as
the authentic expression of the parties' intention, the intentions
approach which was emphatic of the "original intentions" as expressed
in the travaux prparatoires(preparatory work); and the teleological
approach, which was emphatic of the objectives and purposes in treaty
interpretation. 1 4 Though the debate was intense, by 1966, textualism
apparently had prevailed in the ILC drafts. 1 5 Sir Ian Sinclair, the
authority on the Vienna Convention who participated in ILC's
preparation work, noted that:
The Commission's proposals (which were adopted virtually without
change by the Conference and are now reflected in Articles 31 and 32
of the Convention) were clearly based on the view that the text of a
treaty must be presumed to be the authentic expression of the
intentions of the parties; the Commission accordingly came down
firmly in favor of the view that "the starting point of interpretation is
not an investigation ab
the elucidation of the meaning of the text,
6

initio into the intentions of the parties". 11

The Vienna Convention was not officially applicable in GATT,' 17
J.INT'L L. 24 (1970).
113. I. M. Sinclair, Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties, 19 INT'L & COMP. L. Q.

Rosenne, The Role of the InternationalLaw Commission, 64 AM.

47 (1970); SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW OF TREATIES: A GUIDE TO THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION (1970) (discussing the process and preparatory work

of the International Law Commission which eventually led to the conclusion of the Vienna
Convention).
114. Sinclair, supra note 113, at 60-66; Francis G. Jacobs, Varieties of Approach to
Treaty Interpretation: With Special Reference to the Draft Convention on the Law of
Treatise before Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 18 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 318 (1969).
115. U.N. GAOR, 17th & 18th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1 (Jan. 3-28, 1966),
reprinted in 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 248 (1967). Shabtai Rosenne, Interpretation of Treaties in
the Restatement and the InternationalLaw Commission 's Draft Articles: A Comparison, 5
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 205 (1966) (comparing the interpretive approaches adopted in the
ILC's draft and that in the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
made by the American Law Institute, which was published almost simultaneously).
116. SINCLAIR, supra note 9, at 115.
117. John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal System: A Policy Analysis,
86 AM. J. INT'L. L. 310, 314 n.16 (1992) (".... the Vienna Convention technically does not
apply to some treaties (e.g., those which preceded the Convention)."); Thomas J.
Schoenbaum, Free International Trade and Protection of the Environment: Irreconcilable
Conflict? 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 700, at 719 n. 108 (1992) ("Technically, the Vienna Convention
does not apply to the GATT because the GATT preceded it."); Kevin C. Kennedy,
Reforming U.S. Trade Policy to Protect the Global Environment: A MultilateralApproach,
18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 185, at 207 n.104 (1995) ("Because GATT predates the Vienna
Convention, the Convention does not govern the interpretation of GATT. Nevertheless, the
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but the substance of the Vienna Convention had already been a factor in
GATT's practice, as Thomas J. Schoenbaum noted.' 1 8 The notion of
"ordinary meaning" in Article 31 was already working in some of the
GATT panel decisions. In Canada-AlcoholicDrinks (1988), a GATT
Panel stated, "[t]he Panel considered that the phrase 'a reasonable
margin of profit' should be interpreted in accordance with the normal
meaning of these words in their context of Article II and Article 31 of
the Havana Charter . . . ."119 In Japan Alcoholic Beverages I (1987),
another GATT Panel discussed and tried to decide the "ordinary
meaning" of GATT Article 111:2.121 In U.S.-Customs Fee (1987), the
"ordinary meaning" of "cost of services rendered" under GATT Articles
11:2(c) and VIII: 1(a), was discussed.' 2 1 In U.S.-Sugar I (1989), a GATT
panel discussed the "ordinary meaning" of GATT Article 11.122 In an unadopted case EC-Cotton Yarn from Brazil (1995), a GATT Panel
interpreted "allowance" in Article 2:6 of the 1979 AD Code. 123 In none of
the above cases was the Vienna Convention referred to explicitly.
However, explicit reference to the Vienna Convention came in the 1990s.
In U.S.-Salmon from Norway (1992), the GATT Panel clearly
acknowledged that the Vienna Convention
required a reading of treaty
124
meaning."'
"ordinary
the
to
giving effect
Vienna Convention primarily codifies customary international law on the subject of treaty
interpretation and is considered authoritative."). See also Nichols, supra note 50, at 422.
118. Schoenbaum, supra note 117, at 719 n.108 ("Accordingly, although it has never
formally ratified the Convention, the United States accepts the substantive provisions of the
Vienna Convention as authoritative on the subject.").
119. Report of the Panel, Canada-Import,Distributionand Sale of Alcoholic Drinks by
CanadianProvincialMarketing Agencies, 4.16, L/6304 (Feb. 5, 1988), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th
Supp.) at 37, 87 (1989) [hereinafter Canada-AlcoholicDrinks] (emphasis added).
120. Report of the Panel, Japan-Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on
Imported Wine andAlcoholic Beverages, 5.5, L/6216 (Oct. 13, 1987), GATT B.I.S.D. (34th
Supp.) at 83, 113-15 (1988) [hereinafter JapanAlcoholic Beverages 1].
121. Report of the Panel, UnitedStates Customs User Fee, 80, L/6264 (Nov. 25, 1987),
GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 245, 277 (1989).
122. Report of the Panel, United States-Restrictionson Imports of Sugar, 5.2, L/6514
(June, 9, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 331, 342 (1990) [hereinafter U.S.-Sugar I
(1989)].
123. Report of the Panel, European Community-Imposition of Antidumping Duties on
Imports of Cotton Yarn from Brazil, 494, ADP/137 (July 4, 1995), un-adopted, 1995
GATTPD LEXIS 3 [hereinafter EC-Cotton Yarn from Brazil].
124. Report of the Panel, United States-Imposition of Antidumping Duties on Imports
of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway, 298, ADP/87 (Nov. 30, 1992), GATT
B.I.S.D. (4 1st Supp.) at 229, 344 (1997) [hereinafter US.-Salmonfrom Norway].
The interpretation of Article 3:4 advocated by the United States in the proceedings
before this Panel would have the Panel ignore the "through the effects" clause of
Article 3:4 in its entirety. Such an interpretation was inconsistent with the ordinary
meaning of the words and with the drafting history of the paragraph. The Vienna
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In contemporary WTO jurisprudence,
considered by WTO panels and AB as the
interpretation."1' 25 The direct reason that the
applicable is Article 3.2 of the Dispute
(DSU), which provides:

the Vienna Convention is
"fundamental rule of treaty
Vienna Convention became
Settlement Understanding

The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system.
The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and
obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify
with
the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance
26
customary rules of interpretation of public international law.1
The AB in U.S.-Gasoline (1996) noted that this general rule of
interpretation "has attained the status of a rule of customary or general
international law."' 127 The Vienna Convention therefore becomes the
Convention on the Law of Treaties required that "a treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." Thus, international
interpretive practice was to give meaning to all phrases in a text.
Id.
125. U.S.-Gasoline, supra note 109, text of the report accompanying note 33. This
was followed immediately by the Appellate Body Report in Japan-AlcoholicBeverages II,
supra note 93; Bananas III (WT/DS27/R, 1997), supra note 95, para. 7.14 (general
applicability of Article 31(1) of Vienna Convention), para. 7.302 (applying the Vienna
Convention to interpret "treatment no less favorable" in Article II of GATS). However, the
latter interpretation was rejected by the Appellate Body, see BananasIII (WT/DS27/AB/R,
1997), supra note 95, para. 231. See also Appellate Body Report, India-PatentProtection
for Pharmaceuticaland Agricultural Chemical Products, 46, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19,
1997) (adoptedJan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter India-PatentProtection].
126. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, results of the uruguay round (1994) [hereinafter
DSU]; see also WTO Agreement, supra note 3.
127. U.S.-Gasoline,supra note 109, text of the report accompanying note 34. See also
Panel Report, European Communities-Antidumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-type Bed
Linen from India, WT/DS 141 /R (Oct. 30, 2000) [hereinafter EC-Bed-Linen from India
(2000)], the WTO panel follows the interpretation of investigating authorities after a careful
consideration, including the principle of the Vienna Convention, para. 6.136. In another
recent case, a WTO panel suggests that, "[i]n recent years, the jurisprudence of the
Appellate Body and WTO panels has become one of the richest sources from which to
receive guidance on their application." Panel Report, UnitedStates-Sections 301-310 of the
7.21, WT/DS152/R, (circulated to members on Dec. 22, 1999)
Trade Act of 1974,
(adopted Dec. 22, 1999 [hereinafter U.S.-Sections 301-310]. Other examples include,
Panel Report, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products, 7.18, WT/DS50/R (Sept. 5, 1997), as corrected and modified by the Appellate
Body in India-Patentprotection, supra note 125, 45; Panel Report, Guatemala-Antidumping InvestigationRegarding Portland Cementfrom Mexico, 7.7, WT/DS60/R (June
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basic guidance for the WTO Panels and AB for treaty interpretation.128
In Japan-Alcoholic Beverages H (1996), a similar philosophy was put
clearly that,
the startingpoint of an interpretation of an international treaty, such as
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in accordance with
Article 31 VCLT [Vienna Convention], is the wording of the treaty.
[Though] [t]he wording should be interpreted in its context and in the
light of the object and the purpose of the treaty as a whole and
subsequent practice and agreements should be taken into account.
Recourse to supplementary means of interpretation should be made
exceptionally
only under the conditions specified in Article 32
29
VCLT. 1
This was fully confirmed by the Appellate Body in the Shrimp/Turtle
case, when it stressed that,
A treaty interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the
particular provision to be interpreted. It is in the words constituting
that provision, read in their context, that the object and purpose of the
states parties to the treaty must first be sought.
In the words of another WTO Panel, any interpretation of the ordinary
meaning of treaty provisions has to start from the "raw" text of the
relevant treaty provision,1 3 ' even though, ironically, the Panel
acknowledged that to construe the requirement of a particular text in an
' 32
international treaty can be "notoriously difficult, or at least delicate."'
Embracing the Vienna Convention, of course, has its symbolic

19, 1998) (interpreting "matter" under Anti-dumping Code), corrected by the Appellate
Body on appeal, AB-1998-6,
71-79, WT/DS60/AB/R (Nov. 2, 1998); Panel Report,
European Communities-TradeDescription of Sardines, 7.11-13, WT/DS231/R (May 29,
2002) (citing and relying on Gasoline doctrine).
128. Lennard, supra note 10, at 17.
129. Panel Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,
6.9, WT/DS8/R,
WT/DS1O/R, WT/DSll/R (Jul. 11, 1996) (emphasis added). This was, in principle,
confirmed by the Appellate Body later, see Japan-AlcoholicBeverages I1 supranote 93.
130. Shrimp/Turtle,supra note 44, 114.
131. U.S.-Sections 301-310, supra note 127, 7.22.
132. Id. 7.64. The Appellate Body admits that the term "matter" in Article 17.4 of the
Antidumping Code, "has many ordinary meanings." Appellate Body Report, GuatemalaAnti-dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement from Mexico,
71,
WT/DS60/AB/R (Nov. 2, 1998).
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values for the newly established WTO. AB believed that the Vienna
Convention would make sure that the covered agreement "is not to be
read in clinical isolation from public international law." 133 The
recognition and application of the treaty interpretation under the Vienna
Convention by the WTO dispute settlement system is welcomed by
commentators who believe that by this recognition, the WTO is
embracing the principles of public international law and therefore 1 34
is
law.
international
of
evolution
of
enterprise
larger
a
to
contributing
However, the symbolic value at the WTO should not be overstated. In
embracing the "ordinary meaning," the WTO jurisprudence differs from
other international institutions such as ECJ or ICJ. Claus-Dieter
Ehlermann, who served as one of the seven members in the WTO
Appellate Body from 1995-2001 after serving on the ECJ, recalls,
"[w]hen I arrived in Geneva [in 1995], I was accustomed to a very
different legal culture of interpretation .... [T]he Court of Justice in
Luxembourg (ECJ) favours an interpretation that relies heavily on
object and purpose. However, it is risky to ascertain the object and
purpose that the parties pursued
if the object and purpose is not
' 35
expressed in the treaty itself."'
The Vienna Convention is also of practical value. Robert Howse
rightly highlighted the internal circumstances in the early years of the
WTO dispute settlement system. Since Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention states that provisions of a treaty be given their ordinary
meaning in context and in light of the treaty's object and purpose, the
WTO is acting carefully within its own "jurisdiction" and,
in emphasizing the importance of the exact words, the AB is...
taking the words as the necessary beginning point for an interpretive
exercise that includes teleological dimensions. Most importantly, it is
rejecting the tendency of the panels to assume a certain purpose prior
to careful textual interpretation, thereby taking a shortcut to the
establishment of treaty meaning that bypasses the exact text. This
133. U.S.-Gasoline,supra note 109, text of the report accompanying note 35.
134. Lennard, supra note 10, at 86-87; Meinhard Hilf, Power, Rules and Principles:
Which Orientation for WTO/GATT Law? 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 111, 121 (2001) (arguing that

the Appellate Body recognized public international law principles "outside" the WTO
agreements); James Cameron & Kevin R. Gray, Principles ofInternational Law in the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body, 50 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 248, 254-56 (2001).
135. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Reflections on the Appellate Body of the WTO, 6 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 695, 699 (2003) [hereinafter Reflections on the Appellate Body of the WTO]; see
also Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Six Years on the Bench of the 'World Trade Court': Some
Personal Experience as Member ofthe Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, 36
J. WORLD TRADE 605 (2002) [hereinafter Six Years on the Bench].
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prevents the interpreter from having to 'test' their view of purpose
against the exact words used in the treaty, a necessary safeguard
a legal
against the importation or prioritization of a single purpose into 36
text crafted to balance diverse, and possibly competing, values.1

In some cases, AB apparently was giving instructions to the panels on
treaty interpretation. For instance, in Hormones I1 (1998), 137 after
pointing out that the Panel's conceptual dichotomy of "risk assessment"
and "risk management" has "no textual basis" under Article 5 of the
SPS Agreement,' 3 8 the AB further highlighted a general principle, that,
"[t]he fundamental rule of treaty interpretation requires a treaty
interpreter to read and interpret the words actually used by the
agreement under examination, and not words which the interpreter may
feel should have been used."' 139 In that sense, an important role of the
WTO Appellate Body, often neglected by both its critics and
defenders,14 is to discharge its institutional responsibility as a
"supervisor" that manages the jurisprudential move of the many ad hoc
Court does in its relations with
WTO panels, just as the U.S. Supreme
14 1

the circuit courts and district courts.
No doubt, this is a very delicate job, given the limited mandate
from the DSU and the practice of judicial settlement of disputes in the
international arena.' 42 Perhaps, the most convenient and legitimate

136. Robert Howse, AdjudicativeLegitimacy and Treaty Interpretationin International
Trade Law: The Early Years of WTO Jurisprudence, in THE EU, THE WTO AND THE
NAFTA: TOWARDS A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 35, 54 (Joseph H. H. Weiler

ed., 2000) (emphasis in original).
137. Hormones III, supra note 96, para. 181.
138. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15,
1994, the WTO Agreement, Annex IA, RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 3

[hereinafter the SPS Agreement].
139. Hormones 111,supra note 96, para. 181.
140. Debra P. Steger, The Appellate Body and Its Contribution to WTO Dispute
Settlement, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR
OF ROBERT E. HUDEC 482, 487 (Daniel L. M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002)
[hereinafter THE POLITICAL ECONOMY].

141. Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L.
REv. 1093 (1987) (discussing how the U.S. Supreme Court ".... can manage the system by
allocating functions between agencies and courts so as to reduce the chance that the lower
courts will introduce undesirable geographical diversity into national law, thus reducing the
number of occasions when the Court must intervene. It will be required to police only the
understanding of this allocational rule, not particular outcomes.").
142. DSU, supra note 126. (Article 19:2 of the DSU provides, "In accordance with
paragraph 2 of Article 3, in their findings and recommendations, the panel and Appellate Body
cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements."
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resource for AB is its interpretive power when a piece of text of the
WTO agreements is in question. The delicacy is also its inescapable
dilemma: for legitimacy, it needs to point to the text from time to time,
to demonstrate that "[W]TO rules are reliable, comprehensible and
enforceable"; on the other hand, it cannot have its hands tied completely
by the text in order to sustain the intelligibility and relevance of the
institution in highly controversial cases. Both sides of the dilemma, as
one can see, would agree that textualism is the best approach. They
depart company, however, on crucial questions such as what is there to
be found in the text and what to do with the findings. This dilemma
becomes intensified when the WTO is asked to make tough decisions.
In his reading of Bananas 111 (1997), Professor Hudec noted WTO's
sensitivity to legitimacy concerns:
It may be the very sensitivity of this area, however, that explains the
choices made by the Appellate Body thus far. As noted earlier, the fact
that this policing activity intrudes upon domestic regulatory
sovereignty leaves the new WTO legal institutions particularly
exposed to damaging criticism from national governments that do not
yet fully accept the WTO's authority in this area. Recognizing this
very exposed position, the Appellate Body may well have concluded
that the safest refuge from political criticism was to stay as close
as
43
possible to the shelter of the legal texts accepted by governments.1
The real question, therefore, is not whether the text provides definite
answers to all the complex and often unexpected questions-any trade
diplomat or trade law practitioner knows that it does not; rather, whether
textualism can fulfill the function of doing the delicate job, whether one
side of the dilemma would hijack the interpretive process and may tip the
balance toward one side, and thus either undermines the fidelity or its
intelligibility of the institution. My argument is that semantic textualism
fails to pass either test.
This is a continued limitation since the 1982 GATT Ministerial Declaration. See Ministerial
Declaration,supra note 52).
143. Robert E. Hudec, GATTI/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for

an "Aim and Effects" Test, 32 INT'L LAW. 619, 633 (1998) [hereinafter Requiem for an
"Aim and Effects " Test]. See also Warren H. Maruyama, A New Pillar of the WTO: Sound
Science, 32 INT'L LAW. 651, 673 (1998) (arguing, "In interpreting the WTO, the Appellate
Body has relied heavily on the plain meaning of the WTO texts and on rules of treaty
construction set out in the Vienna Convention. In contrast, key elements of recent Article III
and XX jurisprudence by GATT panels have drawn more from inspiration and the
underlying principles of the GATT/WTO than from the four comers of the GATT and WTO
Agreements.").
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"OrdinaryMeaning'"and the Dictionary

One consequence of textualist reading of WTO agreements, by
comparison with the early GATT jurisprudence, is that the WTO panels
are more frequently engaged in the business of defining terms and
phrases, and also, many of the definitions are legally and politically
significant. However, "ordinary meaning" in textualism often faces a
paradox: meaning of a clause in the trade agreements may not be
"ordinary" enough for the purpose of determining its exact meaning.
Thus even a plain reading needs some assistance and the dictionary is
often a preferable option. At the outset of this article, I have alluded to
Bentham, who considered the use of dictionary usurpation of legislative
power. 144 Judge Learned Hand (1872-1961), one of the greatest jurists
in American history, called judges following the letter of law the
"dictionary school." He warned, "[n]o judges have ever carried on
literally in that spirit, and they would not be long tolerated if they
did."' 145 However, this warning is very much ignored. At the turn of the
century, the WTO panels and the AB are increasingly resorting to
dictionaries, for the "ordinary" reading of the terms in WTO
agreements. The most popular one in Geneva is The New Oxford
English Dictionary (OED). 146 Other dictionaries, such as Webster's
various editions of dictionaries, 147 special dictionaries such as the
Black's Law Dictionary,148 and the Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of

144. BENTHAM, supra note 7.

145. LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED
HAND 107 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1952). Judge Hand also warned in Cabell v. Markham, 148
F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945), aff'd 326 U.S. 404 (1945), "not to make a fortress out of the
dictionary ......
146. For example, the use of THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON
HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES (L. Brown, ed., 1993) in the last two years: e.g., US-Gasoline,

supra note 109, at n.41 (defining "made effective" by referring to THE NEW SHORTER
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 481 (1993)).

147. Panel Report, Argentina-Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports of

Ceramic Floor Tiles From Italy,

4.965, WT/DSI89/R (Sept. 28, 2001) (defining "to

inform" by referring to WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY); WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1981);

WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1977);

WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1985); Panel Report, Chile-PriceBand

System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain AgriculturalProducts, 7.26, at 126
n.582, WT/DS207/R (May 3, 2002) (defining "similar" by referring to WEBSTER'S
ENCYCLOPEDIA ENGLISH DICTIONARY

957

(1994));

MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S

COLLEGIATE

DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1993).
148. Appellate Body Report, Canada-MeasuresAffecting the Importation of Milk and
the Exportation of Dairy Products, 97, at 25 n.73, WT/DS103/AB/R, WT/DS1 13/AB/R

(Oct. 13, 1999) [hereinafter Canada-DairyProducts] (defining "government" in Article
9.1(a) of the Agreement on Agriculture by referring to BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 695
(1990)); Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports
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Law, 149 are also cited from time to time. These dictionaries are used for

various purposes: some are legal or semi-legal terms, such as
"government" in Article 9.1(a) of the Agreement on Agriculture,' 50 or
"proceedings" in Article 17.10 of the DSU,1 5 1 or "consistency" in
Article 21.5 of the DSU,1 52 or "payment" in the term "payments-inkind" in Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture, 53 or "remedy" in
Article 15,154 or "term" and "condition" in Article 2.4 of the
Antidumping Agreement (also called the AD Agreement);' 55 some are
verbs, "arise" and "application" in Article XXIII of the GATT 1994,156
or "prevent" in paragraph 5 of Article XXIV GATT 1994,157 "include"
159
in Article 3.4,158 or "explore" in Article 15 of the AD Agreement;

of Cotton-Type Bed-Linen from India 80, at 25 n.44, WT/DS141/AB/R (Mar. 1, 2001)
[hereinafter EC-Bed-Linen from India] (defining "realize" in the "weighted average of the
actual amounts incurred and realized" in Article 2.2.2(ii) of the Antidumping Agreement, by
referring to BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1271 (1991)).

149. E.g., Appellate Body Report, United States-Countervailing Duties on Certain
Corrosion-ResistantCarbon Steel Flat Productsfrom Germany, n.295 WT/DS213/R (Nov.
28, 2002) [hereinafter U.S.-Steel Flat Productsfrom Germany].
150. Canada-DairyProducts, supra note 148.
151. Appellate Body Report, Brazil-ExportFinancing Programmefor Aircraft, 121,
at 33 n.36, WT/DS46/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999) [hereinafter Brazil-Aircraft] (defining
"proceedings" by referring to THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2364
(1993)).
152. Appellate Body Report, Canada-Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian
Aircraft: Recourse by Brazil on the Article 21.5 of the DSU,
37, at 12 n.36,
WT/DS70/AB/RW (July 21, 2000) (defining "consistency" by referring to THE NEW
SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 486 (1993), and THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY

285 (1995)).
153. Canada-DairyProducts, supra note 148, paras. 103-12 (defining "payment" by
referring to THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY and THE SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 1532 (1983)).

154. EC-Bed-Linenfrom India (2000), supra note 127, para. 6.228 n.86, "remedy," by
referring to THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1993).

155. Panel Report, United States-Antidumping Measures on Stainless Steel Plate in
Coils and Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip from Korea,WT/DS 179/R, 6.75 n.78-79 (Dec.
22, 2000) [hereinafter U.S.-Steelfrom Korea], citing THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH

DICTIONARY 472, 3253 (1993) (defining "condition" and "term," respectively).
156. Appellate Body Report, India-Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of
Agricultural, Textile andIndustrial Products, WT/DS90/AB/R,
91-92 n.31-32 (Aug. 23,
1999) [hereinafter India--Quantitative Restrictions], citing THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 100, 113 (1993) (defining "application and "arise," respectively).

157. Appellate Body Report, Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing
Products, WT/DS34/AB/R 45 n.12 (Oct. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Turkey--Textile], citing
THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2348 (1993) (defining "prevent").

158. EC-Bed-Linen from India (2000), supra note 127, 6.156 n.58, citing THE NEW
(defining "include").
159. Id. at
6.233 n.91, citing THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
(1993) (defining "explore").
SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1993)
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some are adjectives, "competitive" in Article 111:2 of the GATT 1994,160
or "comparable" in Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement;1 6' some are
even prepositions, "such as" in Article 3.4,162 or even "between" in
Article 2.4 of the AD Agreement,' 63 etc. The list of examples can be
much longer. On some occasions, such as in India-Quantitative
Restrictions (1999); 164 the WTO panel or AB even directly refer to
"dictionary meaning," when they actually mean "ordinary meaning"
under the Vienna Convention.
One may wonder if there is any ranking in the authority of the
different dictionaries. For example, do law dictionaries have higher
authority over the more general dictionaries? Probably not, though it is
not an easy decision to make: law dictionaries reflect the professional
vocabulary, which might be more attractive to the people sitting on the
bench; on the other hand, one can also legitimately claim that the
Vienna Convention only requires the "ordinary meaning," not "ordinary
meaning in the professional vocabulary." Interestingly, in Thailand-HBeams (1999), the dictionary became a contested issue in the
interpretation of "positive" and "objective" in the requirement of
"positive evidence" and "objective examination" in Article 3.1 of the
AD Agreement. At first, the WTO Panel defined both terms by referring
to Concise Oxford Dictionary.165 On appeal, the Thai government
contended that the WTO Panel erred in relying on the Oxford
Dictionary while they should have relied upon the Black's Law
Dictionary instead. 66 The AB implicitly questioned the Panel's finding
in ordinary meaning, but then decided that, ironically, the ordinary

160. Appellate Body Report, Korea-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS75/AB/R,
WT/DS84/AB/R, T 114 n.89 (Jan. 18, 1999) [hereinafter Korea-Alcoholic Beverages],
citing THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 459 (1993) (defining

"competitive").

161. US-Steel from Korea, supra note 155, at
6.120 n.120, citing THE NEW
SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 457 (1993) (defining "comparable"). See also ECBed-Linen From India, supra note 148, 57 n.24, citing THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY
OF CURRENT ENGLISH 269 (1995) (defining "comparable").
162. Panel Report, Thailand-Anti-DumpingDuties on Angles, Shapes and Sections of
Iron on Non-Allow Steel and H-Beams from Poland,WT/DSI22/R,
7.225 n.233, (Sept.
28, 2001) [hereinafter Thailand-H-Beams (2000)], citing THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1993) (defining "such as"); EC-Bed-Linen from India (2000), supra
note 127,
6.156 n.57, citing THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1993)

(defining "such as").
163. U.S.-Steel from Korea, supra note 155, para. 6.98 n.106, citing THE NEW
SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1993) (defining "between").

164. India-QuantitativeRestrictions,supra note 156, IT 91-92.
165. Thailand-H-Beams (2000), supra note 162, T 7.143.
166. Id.
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meaning of the two terms did not have the controlling weight in
understanding the whole clause:
Even if we accept that the ordinary meaning of these terms is reflected
in the dictionary definitions cited by the Panel, in our view, the
ordinary meaning of these terms does not suggest that an investigating

authority is required.... 167

Thus, the AB rejected the Panel's interpretation,' 68 but did not say
anything about which dictionary is better. In fact, shortly after rejecting
the Panel's above interpretation, the AB found itself defining ordinary
meaning of "establishment" in Article 17.6(i) of the AD Agreement by
resorting to The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary(1993)! 169

The use of dictionary, however, cannot be viewed as a random way
of looking for references in the search for textual meaning. Rather, as
John Greenwald recently points out in his comments on some antidumping, countervailing duty and safeguard cases, the WTO panels and
the AB select "ordinary" meanings "in a highly selective and resultoriented way."'1 70 In other words, the textual meaning is sought for its
value in justifying a policy result that the WTO panels and the AB
prefer. An example is, in EC-Bed-Linenfrom India (2000), where AB
used an Oxford Dictionary definition to interpret "comparable" in
Article 2.4.2 of the AD Agreement, referred to earlier., 7 1 Greenwald
notes that Webster's CollegiateDictionary has a different definition; in

fact, "the 'ordinary meaning' of the word 'comparable' is elastic enough
to allow for product type and/or model distinctions within a broad 'like
product' category of bed linens."' 172 The trick is, I shall add here,
whenever a dictionary definition is employed, we can always find a
different definition, either within the same dictionary or by checking out
an equally respectable dictionary. Thus, the trouble with textualism is
that it can be easily paralyzed by the fact that there are always more
than one ordinary meaning. As a result, the seemingly "strict
interpretation," in effect, leaves a lot of room for WTO panels and the
AB.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id
Id.
Id.
John

107.
111.
116.
Greenwald, WTO Dispute Settlement: An Exercise in Trade Law Legislation,

6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 113, 119 (2003).

171. EC-Bed-Linenfrom India, supra note 148,
172. Greenwald, supra note 170, at 119.

57 n.24.
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Greenwald's observation is also true in other areas in WTO
adjudication. In Fuji-Kodak (1998),'
the WTO Panel relied upon the
Concise Oxford Dictionary in deciding the meaning of the term
"measure" in GATT Article XXIII: I(b). The GATT Article XXIII: I(b),

the non-violation nullification and impairment clause, confers upon a
member to state the cause of action when any benefit accruing to it
directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or
impaired as the result of "the application by another contracting party of

any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions of this
[General] Agreement."' 1 74 The problem,

however, is how broad

"measure" should be. Japan preferred a narrow definition and argued
that in previous GATT panel decisions "measure" had meant either
tariff or product-specific subsidies,

75

i.e., governmental actions; the

U.S. argued for a broad scope for its definition, since it "sets 'no
76
limitations on the types of measures that can be subject to scrutiny."'
The Panel, noting the arguments made by Japan and the U.S., 17 7 agreed

173. Panel Report, Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and
Paper,WT/DS44/R (Mar. 31, 1998) [hereinafter Fuji-Kodak Panel Report].
174. Article XXIII: l(b). For theory and practice of Article XXIII: l(b) before the FujiKodak case, see Cho, supra note 45; ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATTiWTO
DISPUTE SETrLEMENT SYSTEM 135-76 (1997); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Dispute
Settlement System of the World Trade Organizationand the Evolution of the GATT Dispute
Settlement Since 1948, 31 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 1157 (1994); Thomas Cottier & Krista N.
Schefer, Non-violation Complaints in WTO/GATT Dispute Settlement: Past, Present and
Future, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
143-83 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 1997); Frieder Roessler, The Concept of Nullification
and Impairment in the Legal System of the World Trade Organization, in INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 123-42 (1997), id.; Armin
von Bogdandy, The Non-violation Procedure of Article XII:2, GAIT-Its Operational
Rationale, 26 J. WORLD TRADE 95 (1992).
175. Fuji-Kodak Panel Report, supra note 173, 6.26.
176. Id. 6.27.
In the US view, Article XXIII: 1(b) of GATT provides a right of redress to a Member
who considers that any benefit accruing under the Agreement is being nullified or
impaired by the application of any measure whether or not it conflicts with the
provisions of the Agreement. The United States emphasizes that the language of
Article XXIII: l(b) could not be written any more clearly, i.e., it sets no limitations
on the types of measures that can be subject to scrutiny.
Id.
177. The Panel noted,
In this case, Japan argues that measures for purposes of Article XXIII: I(b) must
either provide benefits or impose obligations, and that to impose obligations the
measure must be a government policy or action which imposes legally binding
obligations or the substantive equivalent. The US position is that the term measure
in Article XXIII:l(b) should not be limited to refer only to legally binding
obligations or their substantive equivalent. It argues in favour of a more
encompassing definition of the term.
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that "[t]he ordinary meaning of measure as it is used in Article
XXIII:1(b) certainly encompasses a law or regulation enacted by' 79a
government."1 78 "However, the OED definition of 'measure,
suggests that 'measure' can be as broad as 'legislative enactment' and
'suitable action to achieve some end."' Based on this OED definition,
the Panel concluded that, ". . . in our view, it [the 'measure'] is broader
than that and includes ' other
governmental actions short of legally
80
enactments."'
enforceable
D.

The IntratextualApproach

In addition to the "ordinary meaning," Article 31(1) of the Vienna
Convention also prescribes contextual reading of an international treaty,
and Article 31(2) lists the possible forms of context.18' Contextual
reading differs from the dictionary approach by trying to read beyond
the word and even the clause of an agreement, it is therefore more
sophisticated and can help rectify the limitations of the dictionary
approach. One obvious contribution of the contextual approach is that it
tends to integrate the GATT/WTO agreements,1 82 a positive and
necessary step after the establishment of the WTO. One level of
integration is between the WTO covered agreements and the General
Agreement. In Bananas III (1997), the EC raised the question "whether
the market access concessions for agricultural products made by the
European Communities pursuant to the Agreement on Agriculture
prevail over Article XIII of the GATT 1994. ' 83 The WTO Panel
85
responded in a negative way, 184 which was upheld by AB on appeal.'
The other level of integration is with other international treaties. In

Id. T 10.47.
178. Id. 10.43.
179. Id. n. 1208. THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY (9th ed. 1995).
180. Fuji-KodakPanel Report, supra note 173, 10.43.
181. Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention, supra note 9, provides,

The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties
in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument
related to the treaty.
182. Mitsuo Matsushita, Governance of International Trade Under World Trade
Organization Agreements-Relationships Between World Trade OrganizationAgreements
and Other Trade Agreements, 38 J. WORLD TRADE 185 (2004).
183. BananasIII (WT/DS27/AB/R, 1997), supra note 95, T 153.
184. Id. T 158.
185. Id. TT 154-58.
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Shrimp/Turtle (1998), in its interpretation of "exhaustible natural
resources" in Article XX(g), AB did not look to a dictionary for
definitions, rather, it stressed the dynamic aspect of the WTO
agreement, and "we note that the generic term 'natural resources' in
Article XX(g) is not 'static' in its content or reference but is rather 'by
definition, evolutionary."' The AB referred to two international
environmental conventions, i.e., the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law
of the Sea, the Convention on Biological Diversity,' 86 and the
Resolution on Assistance to Developing Countries, adopted in
conjunction with the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory
Species of Wild Animals.' 87 The AB reached its conclusion:
Given the recent acknowledgement by the international community of
the importance of concerted bilateral or multilateral action to protect
living natural resources, and recalling the explicit recognition by WTO
Members of the objective of sustainable development in the preamble
of the WTO Agreement, we believe it is too late in the day to suppose
that Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994 may be read as referring only to
the conservation
of exhaustible mineral or other non-living natural
188
resources.
The third level of integration is the preamble as part of a WTO
agreement. In U.S.-Salmon from Norway (1992), a GATT Panel was
asked to consider a complaint based on fair and equitable procedures in
the preamble of the 1979 AD Code.' 89 But the GATT Panel found that it
had to put priority to the particular clauses of the Code,' 90 thus the
preamble was not a ground for finding inconsistency.'91

186. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (July 1992, No.

2).
187. Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, June 23,
1979, 19 I.L.M. 11, 15 (Jan. 1980, No. 1).
188. Shrimp/Turtle,supra note 44, 131.
189. U.S.-Salmonfrom Norway, supra note 124, 108.
190. Id. 369.
The Panel considered that the statement in the preamble relied upon by Norway
could guide the Panel's interpretation of specific operative provisions of the
Agreement and noted in this respect that Article 31:2 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties expressly referred to the preamble of a treaty as part of "the
context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty." However, this statement in
the preamble did not by itself constitute a legal obligation of Parties to the
Agreement.
Id.
191. Id. 383.
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However, even the contextual approach faces a danger of being
infiltrated by textualism. In U.S.-Cotton Yarn (2001), a WTO Panel
undertook to interpret "directly competitive products" in Article 6 of the
ATC (the Agreement on Textile and Clothing), and decided that
As indicated in Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention, the "context"
within the meaning of Article 31(1) comprises "the text" of the treaty
itself, including its preamble and annexes. The treaty in question here
is the WTO Agreement, of which the ATC is an integral part. Thus, it
is the WTO Agreement in its entirety, including GATT Article III, that
provides the context of Article 6 of the ATC. 192
Thus, the WTO Panel found AB's interpretation of the phrase "directly
competitive or substitutable products" under GATT Article III in
previous decisions relevant and applicable to its own interpretation of
Article 6 of ATC:
Therefore, we consider that this interpretation of "directly competitive
or substitutable products" is of relevance in interpreting the tenn
"directly competitive products" under Article 6 of the ATC, because
GATT Article III constitutes part of the "context" of Article 6 of the
ATC within the meaning of Article 31(1) of the Vienna
Convention.... 193
Essentially, what the WTO panel did in U.S.-Cotton Yarn (2001) was a
cross-reference, i.e., transplantation of the meaning of one clause into
the interpretation of another, which resembles the intratextualism94
approach in interpretation of the U.S. constitutional law.'
Intratextualism uses the agreement itself as a dictionary in explaining

192. Panel Report, UnitedStates-TransitionalSafeguard Measure on Combed Cotton
Yarn from Pakistan, 7.46, WT/DS192/R (May 31, 2001) [hereinafter U.S.-Cotton Yarn
(WT/DS192/R, 2001)]. See also Agreement on Textile and Clothing, Apr. 15, 1994, the
WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 3 [hereinafter
ATC].
193. US.-Cotton Yarn (WT/DS192/R, 2001), supra note 192, 7.52. Upheld by the
Appellate Body on appeal, WTO AB Report, US.-Cotton Yarn (WT/DS192/AB/R, 2001),
105.
194. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REv. 747 (1999). In the writings
of constitutional law, Professor Ely is considered an earlier advocate of this method of
interpretation, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980).
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terms in different articles. 195 Undoubtedly, the intratextual approach can
be very useful in cases like U.S.-Cotton Yarn (2001). However,
caution is still required.
In Fuji-Kodak (1998), the case centered on nullification and
impairment doctrine under Article XXIII: 1(b) of GATT. In addition to
relying on the dictionary in its broad interpretation of "measure," the
panel also sought support from previous cases in the GATT
jurisprudence. The Panel cited and discussed the interpretations of
"measure" by GATT panels in Japan-Semiconductors (1988),196
Japan-AgriculturalProducts (1988),197 and decided that, in line with
these previous decisions,
we consider that our analysis of the alleged "measures" in this case
must proceed in a manner that is sensitive to the context in which
these governmental
actions are taken and the effect they have on
198
private actors.

Here, the Fuji-Kodak Panel gave the impression that it was following
previous precedents, but the Fuji-Kodak Panel did not distinguish the two
GATT cases and the one in question: the two GATT cases were based
upon a violation complaint and were decided on findings of violation of
the quantitative restriction doctrine under Article XI of GATT, whereas
the case in question was a non-violation nullification complaint under
Article XXIII: 1(b). Of course, the Fuji-Kodak Panel could have found
this distinction insignificant, but, given the long history of clear
distinction between the non-violation from the violation cases,' 99 it seems
quite problematic for the Panel to jump from one interpretation of
"measure" to another without giving the rationales for it. The intratextual
approach, despite all its potential in rectifying the perils of the dictionary

195. Amar, supra note 194, at 791.
196. Report of the Panel, Japan-Trade in Semi-conductors, L/6309 (May 4, 1988),
GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 116 (1988) (discussed in the Fuji-Kodak Panel Report, supra
note 173, 10.45).
197. Report of the Panel, Japan-Restrictions on Imports of Certain Agricultural
Products, L/6253 (Feb. 2, 1988), GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 163 (discussed in the FujiKodak Panel Report, supra note 173, 10.46).
198. Fuji-Kodak Panel Report, supra note 173, 10.46.
199. James P. Durling & Simon N. Lester, OriginalMeanings and the Film Dispute:
The DraftingHistory, Textual Evolution, andApplication of the Non-violation Nullification
or Impairment Remedy, 32 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 211 (1999); Emst-Ulrich
Petersmann, Violation Complaints and Non- Violation Complaints in Public International
Trade Law, 34 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 175 (1991).
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approach, nevertheless faces the danger of using the whole treaty as a
dictionary, and use of the cross-reference without adequate caution. In
sum, semantic textualism in general, as the core of the WTO
jurisprudence in its efforts of establishing the rule-based lEO, gradually
loses sight of its goal of having a workable process with both strength and
flexibility, which has been replaced by a form of insistence in its puzzling
semantics.
E.

Textualism in Doubt

More recently, in US-Softwood Lumber IV (2003),20 AB faced
the question of whether standing timber, i.e., trees before they are
harvested, should be considered as "goods" under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii)
of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (also called
the SCM Agreement). 20 1 Before the WTO Panel, the two parties to the
disputes, Canada and the United States, made painful efforts in citing
dictionaries to define what is "goods. 20 2 The WTO Panel cited Black's
Law Dictionaryin length, 0 3 and concluded that the "ordinary meaning"
of the term "goods" is broad enough to include standing timber.20 4
Having satisfied its ordinary meaning analysis under Article 31 2of
the
05
Vienna Convention, the Panel went on to do a contextual analysis.
On appeal, AB has no disagreement with the Panel on its
conclusion that standing timber is covered by "goods" under
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM Agreement (1994),26 but disagreed
with its reasoning. The AB expresses doubt about the use of dictionary,
"[w]e note... that dictionary definitions have their limitations in
revealing the ordinary meaning of a term. 20 7 Then the AB abandons

200. Appellate Body Report, UnitedStates-FinalCountervailingDuty Determination
with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada,WT/DS257/AB/R (Jan. 19, 2004)

[hereinafter U.S.-Softwood Lumber IV (2003)].
201. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, the WTO
Agreement, Annex 1A, RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 3, at 168 [hereinafter
SCM Agreement (1994)].
202. Panel Report, United States-Final Countervailing Duty Determination with
Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS257/R (Aug. 29, 2003)

[hereinafter Panel Report, U.S.-Softwood Lumber IV (2003)] (modified by the Appellate
Body on appeal).
203. Id. 7.23.
204. Id. 7.24.
205. Id. 7.25.
206. U.S.-Softwood Lumber IV (2003), supra note 200, 67("... we agree with the
Panel that standing timber-trees-are 'goods' within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii)
of the SCMAgreement.").
207. Id. 59.

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 33:393

dictionary definitions of "goods" altogether and never resorts to the
dictionary in the rest of its analysis. Rather, the AB notes that both the
French and the Spanish versions of the term in the SCM Agreement are
broad, and "they correspond more closely to a broad definition of
'goods' [in the English text]."2 °8 Following Article 33(3) of the Vienna
Convention, which requires that the terms of a treaty authenticated in
more than one language are presumed to have the same meaning in each
authentic text, the AB concluded that "the ordinary meaning of the term
'goods' in the English version of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) of the SCM
Agreement should not be read so as to exclude tangible items of
property, like trees, that are severable from land."20 9
Interestingly, the AB also rejects the intratextual approach used by
Canada in the proceedings. In order to decide the contextual meaning of
"goods" under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii), Canada contends that the Panel
should consider Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement deals with
"subsidies contingent.., upon the use of domestic over imported
goods. '210° Because the reference to "imported goods" necessarily refers
to tradable (and indeed traded) goods, Canada reasons that all "goods"
must be tradable and capable of bearing a tariff classification. 2 1 On
appeal, the AB finds this argument not convincing, 21 2 and rejects its
underlying intratextual assumption that the meaning of a term in one
clause must be the same as that in another.213 The AB notes that Article
3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement which addresses a certain situation in
which subsidies favor domestic goods over "imported goods," thus in
that provision, the word "goods" is qualified by the word "imported,"
while in Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii), the word "goods" is not so qualified. The
AB considers this a significant difference, "[t]he use of the word
'goods' in Article 3.1(b), therefore, gives little contextual guidance to
the meaning of the term 'goods' in Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii). Contrary to
Canada's argument, it does not preclude that there may be 'goods' in
the sense of Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii) that are not actually 'imported' or
traded."214

208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Panel Report, U.S.-Softwood Lumber IV (2003), supra note 202,

4.10.

211. Id.

212. U.S.-Softwood Lumber IV (2003), supra note 202, 62.
213. Panel Report, U.S.-Softwood Lumber IV (2003), supra note 202, 4.10. (Canada
contends before the Panel that, "The proper conclusion is that the meaning of 'goods' in
both provisions is identical: tradable items with an actual or potential customs
classification.").
214. U.S.-Softwood Lumber IV (2003), supra note 202,

62.
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This seems a jurisprudential departure from textualism. This is also
adopted by some WTO panels. In EC-Tariff Preferences (2003), a
WTO Panel recently decided that, ". . . the dictionary definition itself is
not dispositive as to whether the Enabling Clause excludes the
application of Article 1:1 .,,215 In EC-Asbestos Products (200 1),216 a
case representing a considerable shift as far as the Article XX(b) health
regulation is concerned,2 17 and also a shift of attitude towards amicus
curiae from NGOs, 2 18 AB noted that dictionary did not offer help in
interpreting the exact meaning when it checks the definition of "like"
from the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary to decide the ordinary
meaning of "like" in the term "like products" in Article 111:4 of GATT
1994. In trying to interpret "like products" under Article 111:4 of GATT,
the AB noted that the term "appears in many different provisions of the
covered agreements, 21 9 however, "while the meaning attributed to the
term 'like products' in other provisions of the GATT 1994, or in other
covered agreements, may be relevant context in interpreting Article 111:4
111:4
of the GATT 1994, the interpretation of 'like products' in Article
220
need not be identical, in all respects, to those other meanings.,
However, it is too early to predict that textualism is "withering
away" easily. As mentioned earlier, the extensive use of dictionaries in
discovering the "plain meaning" of the WTO agreements is hailed by
Petersmann, who regards textualism as "the wisdom" of AB.2 2 ' ClausDieter Ehlermann, mentioned earlier, also finds the dictionary approach
convincing under the Vienna Convention.2 22 He specifically comments
that, the requirement of "ordinary meaning" in the Vienna Convention,
"is easily illustrated by the frequent references in Appellate Body
reports to dictionaries, in particular to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary

215. Panel Report, European Communities-Conditionsfor the Granting of Tariff
Preferences to Developing Countries, 7.44, WT/DS246/R (Dec. 1, 2003) [hereinafter
EC-TariffPreferences].
216. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos

and Asbestos-Containing Products,

92, WT/DSI35/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter

EC-Asbestos Products].
217. M. Gregg Bloche, WTO Deference to National Health Policy: Toward an
Interpretive Principle,5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 825, 833-35 (2002).
218. E.g., Duncan B. Hollis, Private Actors in Public International Law: Amicus
Curiae and the Casefor the Retention of State Sovereignty, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
235, 251-52 (2002).

219.
220.
221.
222.

EC-Asbestos Products,supra note 216, 88.
Id. 89.
Petersmann, supra note 8, at 149.
Six Years on the Bench, supra note 135, at 605.
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Having noted the different approach adopted by ECJ,
Ehlermann, nevertheless, suggests "the very early consensus on
interpretive principles has facilitated decision-making and contributed
considerably to the consistency and coherence of Appellate Body
reports." 224 And on another occasion, when reflecting on his experience
at the AB, Ehlermann further expressed this:
,,223

a method of interpretation that puts the emphasis on the ordinary
meaning of the terms of the treaty is more faithful to the intentions of
the parties of the treaty. It seems to me therefore fair to say that the
heavy reliance on the "ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
the treaty" has largely protected the Appellate Body from criticism
that its reports have added to or diminished the rights and obligations
provided in the covered agreements .... 225
...

Similarly, James Bacchus, then Chairman of the WTO Appellate Body
for two terms, rejects the accusation that the Appellate Body regards the
OED as one of the "covered agreements." Bacchus stresses that, rather,
the dictionary approach is based on merit-that the dictionary is the best
place to find the ordinary meaning: "Yet we do work with words on the
Appellate Body. We do try always to discern the meaning of words. The
meaning of words is discerned in how they are defined. And the words
of the English
language are nowhere better defined, in my view, than in
22 6
the OED."
IV.

LESSONS FOR THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION DEBATE

At the turn of the century, the major international institutions, the
World Bank, IMF and WTO, are increasingly regarded as spokesmen
for global capitalism, and have become targets of criticism for the social
227 Facing the challenge, from within and
activists and commentators. 22
from without, many trade lawyers are on the defensive, naturally. Some

223. Id. at 615-16.
224. Id. at 616.
225. Reflections on the Appellate Body of the WTO, supra note 135, at 699.
226. James Bacchus, Chairman, Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization,
Address to the International Trade Law Conference of the American Bar Association: The
Appeals of Trade: The Making of an Old GATT Hand (Jan. 31, 2003).
227. E.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002); Philip
Stephens, A Poor Case for Globalization: The World's Leaders Are Failing to Address
Legitimate Questions Raised by Protesters about the Effects of Global Capitalism, FIN.
TIMES, Aug. 17, 2001, at 15; James Harding, The Mosquitoes Begin to Swarm, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 2001, at 14.
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defend that the WTO dispute settlement system did not exceed its

authority; 228 others argue that the WTO did manage to keep the balance
between its political and judicial functions. 22 9 The WTO is even
portrayed as the "world trade constitution.

23°

In both fields of international trade law and public international
law, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann is perhaps the most visible advocate of
"constitutionalization" from a human rights point of view. At the turn of
the century, when the international economic order under the framework
of WTO was under most severe challenge from widespread social groups
in the West, Petersmann defiantly regarded the compulsory adjudication
in WTO as the latter's secret of success, and thus endeavored to market it
as a model for the United Nations. 23 1 This is not merely a matter of
judgment. Petersmann, like Jackson and Jan Tumlir, subscribes to the
conceptual dichotomy of power-based and rule-based policy-making, and

regards policy-making in domestic political process on the European
Union level close to the Hobbesian power politics and economic
mercantilism. What the world needs is an external control over
protectionist bias as a consequence of the democratic political process.
228. William J. Davey, WTO Dispute Settlement: Segregating the Useful Political
Aspects and Avoiding 'Over-Legalization,' in NEW DIRECTIONS 291-308 (Marco Bronckers
& Reinhard Quick eds. 2000), supra note 43; William J. Davey, Has the WTO Dispute
Settlement Exceeded Its Authority? A Consideration of Deference Shown by the System to
Member Government Decisions and Its Use of Issue-avoidance Techniques, in THE ROLE OF
THE JUDGE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION 42-80 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C.
Mavroidis eds. 2003) (World Trade Forum 4). See also, Paul C. Rosenthal & Jeffrey S.
Beckington, Dispute Settlement before the World Trade Organization in Antidumping,
Countervailing and Safeguard Actions: Effective Interpretation or Unauthorized
Legislation?,paper presented at IBA Conference in Geneva on March 21, 2003 (on file with
the author).
229. Frieder Roessler, The Institutional Balance between the Judicial and Political
Organs of the WTO, in NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 43, at 325-45; Frieder Roessler, Are the
Judicial Organs of the World Trade Organization Overburdened?, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY,
AND LEGITIMACY, supra note 41, at 308-28.
230. John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, Comment, The World Trade
Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REv. 511 (2000).
231. E.g., Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to Reform the UN System? Constitutionalism,
InternationalLaw and InternationalOrganizations, 10 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 421 (1997); ErnstUlrich Petersmann, How to Reform the United Nations: Lessons from the International
Economic Law Revolution, 2 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 185 (1997-98); Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, How to ConstitutionalizeInternationalLaw and ForeignPolicyfor the Benefit
of Civil Society, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (1998); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to Reform the
United Nations? Lessons from the "InternationalEconomic Law Revolution," 53 Swiss
REV. INT'L ECON. REL. (AuSSENWIRTSCHAFT) 193 (1998); Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, Dispute
Settlement in International Economic Law-Lessons for Strengthening International
Dispute Settlement in Non-economic Areas, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 189 (1999); Emst-Ulrich
Petersmann, Constitutionalismand InternationalAdjudication:How to Constitutionalize the
U.N. Dispute Settlement System? 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 753 (1999).
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From this starting point, thus, this function was also called the
"constitutional" problem. The term "constitution" was not used primarily
in its legal sense; rather, Petersmann shared with Tumlir a strong interest
in ordo-liberalism.
There is a second element in Petersmann's constitutionalization, that
is, his embracement of a version of constitutionalism that is often
attributed to Kant.232 In Petersmann's idealized international economic
order, the WTO represents the universal rules in recognition of trade as a
human right, and its adjudicative process enforces the universal rules to
particular cases.233 Petersmann stresses that in this structure, the two

"categorical imperatives" correspond with each other: the personal
autonomy embodied in taking trade as a human right on the one hand, and
the universal open market competition embodied by the WTO on the
other. The point of constitutionalization, thus, is to eliminate the obstacles
in the realization of the universal rules through claims of individual rights
through the WTO dispute settlement process. For Petersmann, the major
obstacle in this constitutionalization process is the state, and therefore, in
international law, we need to adopt a conceptual shift from the "statecentered" to the human rights approach.234
For quite a long time, international lawyers had largely remained
silent as Petersmann repeatedly and relentlessly made his case for
constitutionalization on various forums of the GATT/WTO or the
European Economic Community/European Union. Not until the turn of
the century, did responses finally emerge, as a minority voice, from the
critiques offered by Philip Alston,235 Robert Howse and Kalypso
Nicolaidis,

236

unfolded in the European Journalof InternationalLaw in

2002. All these critics, speaking from the perspectives of European
Union lawyers and an international human rights lawyer, challenged
232. In doing this, Petersmann is following a tradition in public international law, e.g.,
Carl J. Friedrich, The Ideology of the United Nations Charterand the Philosophy of Peace
of Immanuel Kant 1795-1945, 9 J. POL. 10 (1947).
233. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Foreign Policy Constitution of the European
Union: A Kantian Perspective, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR ERNST-JOACHIM MESTMA.CKER: ZUM
SIEBZIGSTEN GEBURTSTAG 433 (Ulrich Immenga, et al, eds., 1996); ERNST-ULRICH
PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 25-34 (1997).

234. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutionalism and WTO Law: From a Statecentered Approach towards a Human Rights Approach in InternationalEconomic Law, in
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT E.

HUDEC 32 (Daniel L. M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002).
235. Philip Alston, Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade
Law: A Reply to Petersmann, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 815 (2002).
236. Robert Howse, Human Rights in the WTO: Whose Rights, What Humanity?
Comment on Petersmann, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 651 (2002) [hereinafter Comment on
Petersmann].
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that Petersmann had overlooked and thus failed to appreciate the
tensions between human rights and free trade, and that his uncritical
view of European integration and self-congratulating claim of the WTO
success only reveals that his constitutionalization is more Hayekian than
Kantian. 237 In his follow-up comment on Petersmann's lecture, Robert
Howse acutely pointed out that Petersmann's fundamental right
approach and his idealized international economic order centered on
judicial process at the WTO will in fact lead to less, not more, deference
to democratic policy-making on a national level, thus his claim of a
human rights approach actually contradicts with his own notion of
democracy. 8 Subsequently, Howse even goes as far as suggesting that
Petersmann's public-choice argument of "democratic deficit" is actually
a double-sided sword. 239 By pointing out that the WTO rules are
actually created by diplomats acting on behalf of domestic democracy,
Howse suggests that the agency theory used by Petersmann to domestic
policy-making can be equally effectively used to analyze the WTO
itself. Thus it is hard to say whether the WTO facilitates or undermines
democracy. 240 Furthermore, Howse warns, the WTO structure is even in
an disadvantaged position compared with a domestic legal system.
Given WTO's size and decision-making process design, reversing an
undesirable rule or decision is much more difficult, while in domestic
law, a bad decision by the judiciary can be reversed by the action of the
standing legislature. 24 ' Therefore, for Howse, Petersmann's
constitutionalization
goes
too
far; 242
an
alternative
to
constitutionalization is not the human rights approach, but rather a
principle of "institutional sensitivity" or "subsidiarity, 243 meaning that
237. Alston, supra note 235, at 837-41.
238. Comment on Petersmann,supra note 236, at 658.
239. Robert Howse, How to Begin to Think About the 'DemocraticDeficit'at the WTO,
in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND NON-ECONOMIC CONCERNS: NEW
CHALLENGES FOR THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 79-101 (Stefan Griller ed., 2003).

240. Id. at 89-92.
241. Id. at 92-95.
242. Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Legitimacy and Global Governance: Why
Constitutionalizing the WTO Is a Step Too Far, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY

227-63 (Roger B. Porter et al., eds. 2001), supra note 41; this article was subsequently
expanded as Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Legitimacy through "Higher Law" Why
Constitutionalizing the WTO Is a Step Too Far, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION 307 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds.

2003).
243. Robert

Howse

&

Kalypso

Nicolaidis,

Enhancing WTO

Legitimacy:

Constitutionalizationor Global Subsidiarity?, 16 GOVERNANCE 73, 86 (2003), available at

http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1 111/1468-0491.00205 (last visited May 30,
2006).
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in dispute settlement process the WTO panels give deference to
decisions or judgment of other institutions. Howse suggests two forms
of subsidiarity: horizontal subsidiarity, i.e., deference given to other
international institutions and norms on issues such as health, labor
standards, the environment, and human rights; 244 the other form is
deference given to member states in their domestic democratic decisionmaking on issues such as risk management.245
In this debate, critics of constitutionalization bring us back to
reality about the WTO and the international economic order it
represents. This is an important and necessary task when, as John Gray
246
recently observes, "the utopian mind has migrated from left to right,,
when in Petersmann and his company's idealized international
economic order, concerns of issues other than free trade are brushed
aside on the grounds of public-choice and Hayekian rationality. I am
also sympathetic to the alternatives proposed by Howse, the institutional
sensitivity, and believe it points to the right direction for the reform of
the WTO in the near future. And yet, the critiques touch little upon
Petersmann's theory of adjudication, which is the theoretical foundation
of Petersmann's constitutionalization arguments. A sharp critic such as
Howse seems reluctant to question the wisdom of the WTO Appellate
Body in its adjudication practice in his rejection of the
constitutionalization rhetoric.24 7

However, it is the presumption that adjudication means ruleapplication, rule-following, thus nonpolitical, that leads Petersmann to
the conclusion that constitutionalization represents the rule-based order,
which is superior to the power-oriented by nature. In other words,
Petersmann's constitutionalization, when backed up by his adjudication
theory, is more serious than it appears for the critics in the 2002 debate.
244. Id. at 75.
245. Robert Howse, Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at
the World Trade Organization, 98 MICH. L. REv. 2329 (2000); Robert Howse, Managing
the Interface between International Trade Law and the Regulatory State: What Lessons
Should (and Should Not) Be Drawn from the Jurisprudenceof the United States Dormant
Commerce Clause, in REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION

INWORLD TRADE LAW 139 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2000); Michael
Trebilcock & Robert Howse, Trade Liberalization and Regulatory Diversity: Reconciling
Competitive Markets with Competitive Politics, 6 EURO. J. L. & ECON. 5 (1998).
246. John Gray, The World Is Round, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS (Aug. 11, 2005, No. 13)
(reviewing THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY (2005)).
247. Robert Howse, The Most Dangerous Branch? The Limits andRole of the Judicial
Power in the WTO, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION 11
(Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2003); Susan Esserman & Robert Howse, The
WTO on Trial, 82 FOREIGN AFF. 130 (2003).
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We should not, however, blame Petersmann for not making his
presumptions explicit enough, partially because this is too fundamental
for him, and for the generation of trade officers of GATT in the 1980s,
such as Jan Tumlir who was also heavily influenced by the ordo-liberal
economics and public-choice theory. Nevertheless, Petersmann's
constitutionalization cannot be undermined without looking into his
adjudication theory and bringing up another aspect of reality that the
utopian right often is unwilling to admit: how the GATT/WTO "rulebased" dispute settlement works in the practice of adjudication. This is
exactly what this article is trying to do. By looking into the
interpretative doctrines of the GATT/WTO textualism, I have tried to
demonstrate that the adjudication theory has been, in part, based on a
fragile and overstated claim of textual meaning. The irony, and thus a
fatal weakness in logic, of this repeated claim of textual meaning is that
it is often made when the exact meaning itself is in question. Thus, the
textualists in the practice of GATT/WTO adjudication are totally
uninformed about the hermeneutical fact that meaning is constitutive of,
not in isolation from, our social life. Therefore, what is problematic in
the constitutionalization rhetoric is not so much about its ends, its
idealized order itself, but rather its means. In the constitutionalization
debate, the question raised by critics of Petersmann is whether he is
misusing history (of WTO and European integration). What I am
suggesting here is that we should also ask whether the "rule-based"
international
economic
order
based
on
Petersmann' s
constitutionalization theory faces the risk of abusing the rules
themselves.
CONCLUSION

Today, the international economic order, or perhaps international
law in general, is facing various challenges, some most severe ones
coming from outside the international institutions. For international
lawyers, including those in the field of international trade, we have
come to another moment when we want the international institutions
and international norms strengthened, not weakened. But there are
different ways to do this: we could continue preaching an idealized
internationalism and brushing aside concerns about legitimacy and
soundness of the policies, or we could bring more critical thinking into
our conceptual frameworks and thus make our institutions more
accommodating to those concerns and criticism. This article is based on
the assumption that the latter strategy is more desirable, and the central
point made here is that textualism as a foundation of the mainstream
theory of adjudication in WTO jurisprudence does not offer a critical

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 33:393

mind and thus makes it less likely to be responsive when those concerns
and criticism, when well taken, would have strengthened the WTO as an
international institution. Textualism has an inescapable internal tension
when it is used as a shield from social critique: the claim of textual
meaning is largely dependent upon a consensus, not an inherent quality
in the text itself. Thus, textualism in the practice of GATT/WTO
adjudication is more often employed as a myth. As Northrop Frye has
adeptly put it in a different context, "[t]he anxiety of society, when it
urges the authority of a myth and the necessity of believing it, seems to
be less to proclaim its truth than to prevent anyone from questioning
i,,248

Mike Moore, then the Director-General of WTO, recalled the
shocking experience he had during the 1999 Seattle WTO Meeting and
the puzzlement in his mind: "[a]s we were corralled behind barbed wire
barricades, I found myself wondering how such fine, noble, principled
expressions of universal values and rights as internationalism and
solidarity had become so denigrated., 249 Moore's shock in Seattle is a
real one, it is a telling story. For many of the trade diplomats,
economists, and international lawyers who work for GATT/WTO, the
last couple of years has been an alienating experience. But it is
alienating only because, in today's global society, violence in the
streets, either conducted by the anti-globalization demonstrators and/or
even by the police officers, is pretty much visible; whereas violence
conducted by claiming the textual meaning is not. In the words of
Robert Cover, as a conclusion he drew from the legal history in
America, "[b]etween the idea and the reality
of common meaning falls
250
the shadow of the violence of law, itself.

248. NORTHROP FRYE, THE SECULAR SCRIPTURE: A STUDY OF THE STRUCTURE OF
ROMANCE 16 (1976).
249. MIKE MOORE, A WORLD WITHOUT WALLS: FREEDOM, DEVELOPMENT, FREE TRADE
AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 8 (2003).

250. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1629 (1986).

